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CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH
LARRY

E.

RiBsTEiN*

The controversy concerning the nature of the corporation presents a
challenge for constitutional law. If courts continue to embrace the historical
view of the corporation as a legal "person" endowed with personhood at
the will of the state, then it seems to follow that government should have
broad power to limit corporations' rights. But if, as many scholars now
believe,' a corporation is a nexus of contracts, these contract rights should
be constitutionally protected to the same extent as other contract rights.
Thus, the state must show why intervention in the corporate contract is
constitutionally justified given the availability of self-protection through
private contracting.
Resolution of this controversy is important in determining the constitutionality of restrictions on corporate political speech. 2 Most recently, the
Supreme Court decided in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce3 that
laws restricting corporate political activity do not offend the First Amendment. That decision brought full circle a series of cases beginning with
broad recognition of corporate First Amendment rights in Justice Powell's
4
decision in First National Bank v. Bellotti.

This Article asserts that Justice Powell had it right in Bellotti. The
Supreme Court's subsequent curtailment of corporate speech rights is based

on mistaken views both of the nature of the First Amendment interest at
stake in corporate speech and of justifications for state intervention in this
area. More broadly, this Article urges a view of constitutional protection
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Barry Adler, Donald
Boudreaux and participants at a workshop at George Mason provided valuable comments.
The Sarah Scaife Foundation provided financial support.
1. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
2. The principal decisions considering the rights of corporate speakers are Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990); Federal Election
Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982); and First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Of course many First Amendment cases involve corporate
speakers and therefore inferentially recognize that corporations have First Amendment rights.
This Article focuses on cases that explicitly consider the differences between the rights of
corporate and noncorporate speakers.
This Article does not discuss the separate question of whether corporate governance
processes are within the First Amendment's protection of freedom of association. For a
comprehensive discussion of this issue, arguing that the First Amendment should protect
associational rights in commercial as well as noncommercial firms, see Nicholas Wolfson, A
Transaction Cost Analysis of the First Amendment (manuscript on file with the author, April,
1991). See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (compelling state interest
justified requiring non-profit corporation to admit women).
3. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
4. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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of corporate activities that is better informed by economic theories of the

firm and of the electoral process. Providing constitutional protection of
corporate activities is particularly important in light of the continuing
pressure for state and federal election reform.The Article begins by reviewing the Supreme Court's principal corporate

speech decisions in Part I. Part II develops a general framework for analysis
by articulating a pragmatic cost-benefit approach to applying the First
Amendment. Part III then develops the appropriate corporate framework
for applying this analysis, building on the contract theory of the corporation.
Parts IV and V bring together the constitutional and corporate frameworks

by discussing, respectively, the costs and benefits of regulation within a
contract model of the corporation. Part IV discusses the cost side of the
pragmatic approach by explaining the precise First Amendment interest at

stake in corporate speech. Part V critically analyzes possible justifications
for state regulation, including those suggested by the Court. It shows that
these purported justifications do not outweigh the significant protected

interest that is at stake, particularly in light of the availability of contractual
devices as substitutes for regulation. Part VI contains concluding remarks.
I.

COR'ORATE SPEECH IN THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court has dramatically shifted its position on corporate
speech over the eleven-year period between the first and the most recent of
its corporate speech cases. The following brief summary of these cases sets

the stage for the economic analysis of corporate speech that is the focus of
this Article.
A.

Bellotti: First Amendment Protection of Corporate Speech

In First National Bank v. Bellotti,6 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Powell, held that corporate political expenditures and contribu-

tions were constitutionally protected.7 The Court invalidated under the First

5. See Richard L. Berke, A Revival: The Campaign Finance Show, N.Y. TIms, May
26, 1991, § 4, at 2 (discussing spending limits on political campaigns); David Shribman,
Campaign-FinancingReform, Pushed with Zeal by Gov. Chiles, Attracts Converts in Many
States, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1991, at A16 (discussing Florida Governor's attempts to reform
campaign-finance system).
6. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
7. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley the Court held that the Federal
Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431-455 (1988), was unconstitutional to the extent that it
limited expenditures that could be made by an individual or group (including a partnership or
corporation) on behalf of a particular candidate, candidates' use of personal or family funds
to support their own election, and overall expenditures by candidates. Id. at 143. The Court
reasoned that the Act's limitations directly suppressed communication and that contribution
and expenditure limitations "impinge on protected associational freedoms" by restricting the
extent to which people can affiliate with candidates and pool resources to pursue common
goals. Id. at 16-17, 22.
However, the Court distinguished contribution and expenditure restrictions. Contribution
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and Fourteenth Amendments a Massachusetts statute that prohibited certain

business corporations from making contributions or expenditures "for the
purpose of... influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted

to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property,
business or assets of the corporation." The Court reasoned that speech that

otherwise is protected does not lose its protection because of the corporate
identity of the speaker. Corporate speech is protected -not merely as a
property right, but as a part of the guarantee of liberty to all natural and
artificial persons.8 The Court also rejected the idea that First Amendment
protection was a "purely personal" guarantee that was not available to

corporations. 9
Having held that corporate speech was constitutionally protected,
Justice
Powell went on to hold that the statute could not be sustained by any

compelling state interest in preventing corporations from unduly influencing
referendum votes. The Court noted that there was no candidate to corrupt
in this context, and that the First Amendment does not permit restricting
some speech to equalize representation of points of view.10 The Court also
refused to sanction the restriction of corporate speech in order to offset
state-conferred advantages such as limited liability. 1 Nor would the Court
sustain the statute on the ground that the statute protected shareholders
from corporate use of shareholder investments to support views with which
the shareholders disagreed: the shareholders got only narrow protection
under the statute, 12 the statute applied even in the face of unanimous

limits involve less of a restriction on expression and association than expenditure restrictions
because a contribution restriction "entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's
ability to engage in free communication," the amount of a contribution at most "provides a
very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the'candidate," and "the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor." Id. at 20-21. A contribution limitation constrains associational freedom less
than an expenditure limitation because contribution ceilings "leave the contributor free to
become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's
efforts on behalf of candidates." Id. at 22.
The Act's limitations on contributions to single candidates and by an individual during
a calendar year were justified on the ground that they limited actual and apparent "corruption;"
which the Court defined as securing "a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders." Id. at 26. But this government interest did not sustain expenditure limitations.
Nor could expenditure limitations be justified by "the ancillary governmental interest in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections ..
", because "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment ..... " Id. at 48-49.

8. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-80 (1978).
9. Id. at 778 n.14.
10. Id. at 790-91.
11. Id. at 791 n.30.
12. Id. at 767-68. The statute applied only to expenditures by particular types of
organizations and only in referendums. Id. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West
Supp. 1977).
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shareholder authorization, 3 and shareholders had governance mechanisms
for objecting, were not compelled to invest in a corporation, and could
4
disinvest at any time.
Although Bellotti appears firmly to establish First Amendment protection for corporate speech, the decision is explicitly limited to a restriction
on corporate expenditures and contributions in connection with a referendum
campaign. Justice Powell noted that statutes limiting corporate contributions
in candidate elections involve an important governmental interest in preventing corruption of elected officials.' 5 More generally, Powell stated that
in deciding the specific issue of whether corporate speech not relating directly
to the corporation's business interests is protected "we do not ... address
the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights
6
that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment.'
The limited scope of the majority opinion makes the opinions of the
four dissenting Justices particularly important as an indication of the Court's
direction in later cases. Justice White, who wrote for Justices Brennan and
Marshall, reasoned that corporate speech should be protected only when it
furthers self-expression by the shareholders, as is the case with corporations
formed solely to advance particular causes, or press corporations, or commercial speech, which "may be viewed as a means of furthering the desires
of individual shareholders.' ' 7 White reasoned that restricting speech unconnected with the corporation's business leaves shareholders and managers
free to express themselves other than through the corporation. 8 He also
asserted that the state has an interest in regulating corporate speech to
ensure that the special advantages (such as limited liability) it grants corporations to permit the aggregation of corporate wealth are not used to
weight the political debate in favor of corporate views 9 and that shareholders
are not forced to support speech with which they disagree.20
Justice Rehnquist based his dissent on the Court's earlier holding in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward2' that a corporation "possesses only those

13. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-95.
14. Id. at 794-95 & 794 n.34.
15. Id. at 788 n.26.

16. Id. at 777. In the note accompanying the statement quoted in the text, the Court
went on to say:
Nor is there any occasion to consider in this case whether, under different circumstances, a justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as
applied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as aplied to
corporations, unions, or like entities.
Id. at 777 n.13.
17. Id. at 805.
18. Id. at 807-09.
19. Id. at 809-12.
20. Id. at 812-21. Justice White analogized the situation in Bellotti to cases holding that
employees could not be compelled to have their union dues support political causes they
opposed. Id. at 813-19 (discussing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)).
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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properties which the [state-conferred] charter of creation confers on it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."22 In the case of a
nonpress commercial corporation, these "properties" do not include a right
of political expression.3 Thus, the state need not even justify corporate
speech restrictions under the First Amendment.?
B. From Bellotti to Austin
Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti stands as the high point of the
Court's protection of corporate political speech. The dissents in Bellotti
itself foreshadowed the erosion that would occur in subsequent opinions.
In FederalElection Commission v. NationalRight to Work Committee
(NRWC)25 Justice Rehnquist's unanimous opinion held that Congress constitutionally could prohibit a nonprofit corporation from mass soliciting
contributions to a segregated fund from non-"members." The statute's
limitation on associational freedom was justified by the interests in protecting against corporate use of "substantial aggregations of wealth amassed
by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization"
and in protecting individuals from corporate use of money to support
candidates individuals may oppose.? Although the Court distinguished
Bellotti as applying to state referenda rather than candidate elections, 27
NWRC appears broadly to reject Bellotti by tolerating only a slender
justification for restricting corporate speech: NRWC, rather than using a
large treasury amassed through use of corporate "advantages" for political
purposes, merely acted as an administrative intermediary organizing small
contributions into a political force consistent with the expressed wishes of
the contributors.? Thus, NRWC seems consistent with Justice Rehnquist's
refusal to recognize First Amendment protection of the speech of any
29
corporations.

22. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (quoting Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
23. Id. at 825. Like Justice White, Justice Rehnquist distingished corporations organized
"for explicitly political purposes." Id. at 825 n.
24. Id. at 826 n.6.
25. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
26. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-08

(1982).
27. Id. at 210 n.7.
28. NRWC's purpose ironically was to combat the evil of compulsory union dues that
Justice White cited as an analogy in his Bellotti dissent to justify statutory protection of
corporate shareholders (see supra note 20). Id. at 199-200 (quoting NRWC's charter).
29. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. Another indication of the Court's
retreat from First Amendment protection of corporate speech is Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480
(1985). The Court invalidated federal limitations on expenditures by politicalaction committees,
distinguishing NRWC as turning on the law's "special treatment" of corporations." Id. at
495.
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In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life,
Inc. (MCFL) 30 the Supreme Court refused to reach the same result as in
NR WC in a case involving expenditures, as distinguished from the lessprotected activity of campaign contributionsinvolved in NR WC. The Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, held that a federal prohibition
of use of corporate treasury funds for expenditures in a federal election
would unconstitutionally burden the exercise of First Amendment rights as
applied to a newsletter published by a nonprofit corporation organized to
oppose abortion. As in Justice White's Bellotti dissent, the Court reasoned
that government restrictions on corporate political activity could be justified
by the state's interest in preventing political use of corporate wealth amassed
in the economic marketplace. But the Court clarified that the state interest
was only in curtailing political abuse of the corporate form, not in regulating
"use of the corporate form per se." 3 ' This state interest did not apply to
MCFL-type companies whose resources reflected the political views of its
contributors. The Court identified three features that characterize such
corporations:
First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political
ideas, and cannot engage in business activities....

This ensures

that political resources reflect political support. Second, it has no
shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on
its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with the
organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating
with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, [it] was not
established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its
policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents
such corporations from serving as conduits for the type 3of2 direct
spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace.
Thus, the Court seemed to back away from the Rehnquist idea that
corporations as state creations were entitled to no First Amendment protection.33 Notably, Justice Powell joined the MCFL majority.
However, in its latest analysis of the application of the First Amendment
to corporate speech, following Justice Powell's retirement, the Court took
an important step away from Bellotti. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce&4 the Supreme Court held that a Michigan statute's prohibition
30. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).

31. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
259 (1986).

32. Id. at 264 (footnote omitted).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by
Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens, argued that Congress could conclude that the special
advantages of the corporate form create a sufficient potential for corruption and use of
individuals' funds for purposes they oppose to be able constitutionally to distinguish corporations from other organizations. Justice White also wrote separately to state that he adhered
to his Bellotti dissent.
34. 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
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on corporate use of treasury funds for expenditures for or against candidates
for state office was not unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments as applied to a newspaper advertisement placed by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit corporation, in support of a
specific candidate. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall (one of the
Bellotti dissenters) reasoned that the statute, although a direct restriction
on expressive activity, was constitutionally justified by the state's interest
in protecting against "corruption" in the form of "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of Wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation
to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." 3
To see how Austin narrowed First Amendment protection of corporate
speech, it is helpful to review the approaches still available to the Court
after NR WC and MCFL. The Court could have held, as did the Court of
Appeals,3 6 that the Chamber of Commerce should be regarded as an
ideological corporation like MCFL because one of the Chamber's principal
activities was to disseminate ideas and because the Chamber is funded by
dues from members sharing its political goals rather than by revenues from
profit-making activity. The briefs in Austin focused on this issue: most of
the amici briefs were filed by ideological groups arguing on behalf of the
appellee Chamber of Commerce that the case should be governed by
MCFL.37 Also, the Court could have held that, even if the Chamber of
Commerce differed from the corporation involved in MCFL, the restriction
was constitutionally prohibited because it related to the directly expressive
rather than to the less protected category of
category of expenditures
38
contributions.
Despite these available approaches, the Court narrowly applied MCFL.
The Court held that the Chamber, although nonprofit, could be regulated
because the Chamber was not formed for the express purpose of promoting
political ideas, members received nonpolitical benefits from the Chamber
and so would be reluctant to disassociate, and the Chamber could be used
to funnel money from business corporations. Underlying the Court's narrow

-, 110 S. Ct. 1391,
35. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
1397 (1990).
36. See Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
37. See Amici briefs, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.
Ct. 1391 (1990) (No. 88-1569), including Brief for the Center for Public Interest Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee; Brief of the American Medical Association, The
National Association of Realtors and the Amercian Insurance Association as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellee; Brief of Amici Curiae The Washington Legal Foundation and the Allied
Educational Foundation in Support of the Appellee; Brief for Amici Curiae National Organization for Women, Greenpeace Action, National Abortion Rights Action League, National
Right to Work Committee, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, and The Fund for
the Feminist Majority in Support of Appellee; and Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union,
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellee.
38. See supra note 7 (discussing distinction between expenditures and contributions).
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reading of MCFL is an emphasis on the Chamber's adoption of the
corporate form-"the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries." 3 9 The Court rejected arguments that
the statute was overinclusive in reaching close corporations that did not
amass politically potent wealth 4° and underinclusive in not applying to
unincorporated labor unions, 4 1 because the state was entitled to single out
firms adopting the special advantages of the corporate form.4 2
In short, the post-Bellotti cases culminating in Austin whittled Justice
Powell's broad recognition' of First Amendment protection of corporate
political speech down to protection of corporate political activities in referendum contests, and of narrowly defined MCFL-type corporations. Austin's and Bellotti's polar positions cannot both be correct. The rest of this
Article presents an economic basis for choosing between them.

II.

BALANCING

FrST

AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Before discussing the appropriate scope of First Amendment protection
of corporate speech, it is necessary to place this analysis in a general First
Amendment framework. Speech is not absolutely protected, but rather is
accommodated with other social interests. 4 Interests cited as justifying
corporate speech regulation include "corruption" of the political process
and protection of shareholders. 44 This suggests a pragmatic approach to the
scope of First Amendment protection of corporate speech that considers
both the costs and benefits of regulation. The best articulation of such an

39. Austin, 494 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1398. Along similar lines, the Court upheld
the statute's distinction between all corporations and all unincorporated associations against
an Equal Protection argument because of the state's interest in protecting against "political
'war chests' amassed with the aid of advantages given to corporations." Id. at __, 110 S.
Ct. at 1401.
40. Id. at

__,

110 S. Ct. at 1398.

41. Id. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 1401. The Court noted that because employees can refuse
to contribute to a union's political activities while remaining a member in other respects, funds
for a union's activities reflect members' political support. Id. at.., 110 S.Ct. at 1400-01.
But this characteristic is unrelated to the unincorporated form of organization.
42. The Court also rejected a challenge that distinguishing corporations from other
speakers violated corporations' Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at

__

110 S. Ct. at 1401-02.

There were strong dissents by Justice Kennedy, writing for Justices O'Connor and Scalia,
and by Justice Scalia writing separately. Justice Scalia's separate opinion frontally attacked
the justifications advanced for government regulation of corporate speech. Justice Kennedy's
opinion also questioned these justifications, but mainly criticized applying these justifications
to issue-centered nonprofit corporations like the Michigan Chamber of Commerce and emphasized the need to protect the activities of this sort of association.
43. See Thomas 1. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YAu L.J. 877, 920-55 (1963) (articulating some interests relevant to balancing process). Emerson
includes as one of the protectable interests "[p]urification of the [d]emocratic [p]rocess,"
explicitly referring to restrictions on political expenditures. Id. at 948-49.
44. See supra Part I and infra Part IV.
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approach is by Judge Richard Posner. 45 Posner builds on Judge Hand's
rule that a court should determine the constitutionality of a speech restriction
by asking "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 46
Posner reduces this to the formulation that the regulation should be sustained only if
B < PL, where B is the cost of the regulation (including any loss
from suppression of valuable information), P is the probability that
the speech sought to be suppressed will do harm, and L is the
magnitude (social cost) of the harm. 47
More specifically, under the Posner formulation B equals the social loss
from suppressing the information (V) plus error costs (E) of trying to
distinguish valuable from undesirable information, and L is discounted to
present value. Thus, the formula becomes V + E < P x L/(1 + i)n , where
n is the number of periods
between the speech and the expected harm and
48
i is the discount rate.
Under this balancing process, the Court should consider both the
benefits of regulation and its negative effects on speech. The latter include
the effect on interest group power and reduction of information discussed
in Part II(C). The Austin Court implicitly considered the cost of regulation
in holding that a state concern with corporate "corruption" of the political
process could sustain even regulation of politically impotent closely held
firms. The Court's holding can be explained on the basis that the regulation's
negative impact on speech is not so great as to require careful balancing
and narrow tailoring. Justice Scalia's dissent sharply criticized the Court's
holding "that a direct restriction upon speech is narrowly enough tailored
if it extends to speech that has the mere potential for producing social
harm.")N9

Some may object to the quantification that seems inherent in the Posner
formulation. Indeed, the formulaic presentation is startling when compared
with the vagueness that generally characterizes constitutional analysis. But
as already discussed the Posner formula only makes explicit what is implicit
in the Court's balancing process. This clarity aids analysis unless it is carried
too far by inserting arbitrary numbers for symbols.

45. See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech inan Economic Perspective, 20 SUtroLK U. L.
Rv. 1 (1986). For a recent application of this balancing approach, see Judge Posner's
concurring opinion in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990),
rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991).
46. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951). Posner quoted Judge Hand's rule but noted that Hand meant "probability" instead
of "improbability." Posner, supra note 45, at 8 & 8 n.27.
47. Posner, supra note 45, at 8.
48. Id.
49. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 1413 (1990) (emphasis
in original).
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A more serious objection to the Posner formulation is that it invites
weighing the inherent value of speech. For example, Posner argues for the
curtailment of Nazi and Klan speech partly on the basis that "[t]he ideas
that the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan propagate are as worthless as they
are vicious. ' ' 50 He adds that "while Communist dogma cannot be dismissed
so readily, the political successes of Communism have been due largely to
force rather than persuasion." ' 51 The latter statement suggests either that
Communist speech is inherently less worthy of protection because it may
be connected with the use of force, or that speech connected with force
should not be absolutely protected. There is an important difference between
these two conclusions: the first is questionably based on the value of the
speech, while the second is more soundly based on the weight of the state
interest (that is, protecting against force) balanced against it. Thus, it is
appropriate to qualify the Posner analysis by avoiding subjective conclusions
about the merit of speech and concentrating instead on the specific costs
52
of regulation.
Application of the balancing test might be qualified in the present
context if regulation of corporate speech is appropriately characterized as
general regulation of conduct that only incidentally impacts speech. In this
situation, a sort of presumption favoring the regulation applies under United
States v. O'Brien.53 O'Brien held that a government regulation requiring
draft registrants to carry draft cards could be sustained and appropriately
applied to the symbolic act of draft card burning if, among other things,
the regulation furthers a substantial government interest "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression," and if the restriction on speech is no greater
than essential to further the government activity. Thus, if a speech restriction
is "speech-neutral," the restriction may be sustained if it is "contentneutral." '54 This test was most recently applied in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc. s5 to sustain the regulation of nude dancing where such regulation was
incidental to the general regulation of public nudity.
50. Posner, supra note 45, at 6.
51. Id. at 6-7.

52. Posner himself is ambiguous on this point, particularly regarding obscenity. At one
point he says that he is "dubious" about assigning a minimal value to "obscene" speech, but
at another is willing to assign a low value to obscenity for purposes of dismissing error costs
in this area as "de minimus." Id. at 11 & 28-29.
53. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
54. Id. at 376-77. See MELVILLE NiMMR, NllaffiR ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 207 (1984)
(discussing "content-neutral" standard); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, A~mmRCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

789-94 (1988) (same); John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975) (same);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46 (1987) (same); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983)
(same). Cf. S~amN SHIPRrN, Tam FiRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 17 (1990)
(criticizing dichotomy and stating that both distinction and difference between standards applied
in two categories are unclear); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981) (noting difficulty of making distinction and that contentneutral distinctions may have even greater effect on speech).
55. 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991).
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A lower standard of scrutiny for "speech-neutral"

regulation applies

because such regulation is unlikely to have a speech-suppressive purpose
that is contrary to the goals served by the First Amendment5

6

and involves

a low likelihood that any nonspeech justification that government asserts
for the restriction is merely a pretext for suppressing speech rather than a

legitimate state interest. In other words, speech-neutrality is relevant both
to the burden on speech (B in the Posner equation) and to the justification
for regulation (Posner's PL).
The O'Brien test is not, however, applicable to corporate speech.
Corporate speech restrictions clearly affect speech rather than merely expressive conduct, as do any contribution and expenditure limits.5 7 Unlike
the draft card rule involved in O'Brien, corporate speech restrictions cannot
be characterized as general restrictions that only incidentally affect speech."
Rather, the restrictions only address specific types of communication that
assist or oppose a candidate in a political election59 or do not "materially
affect[ ]" the speaker's businessA0
Moreover, the fact that restrictions single out corporate speech does
6
not make them relatively innocuous time, place, and manner restrictions, 1
but rather makes the restrictions content-oriented because they differentially
affect certain viewpoints. 62 The corporate features of limited liability and

56. See Posner, supra note 45, at 18 (stating that speech-directed regulation is more
likely to have "impermissible ... purpose"); Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 54, at
227-33.
57. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing speech versus conduct
distinction); infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text (discussing who within corporation
should be regarded as engaging in this speech).
58. For opposing arguments that corporate speech restrictions are general, and therefore
neutral, in the sense that they apply irrespective of the position advocated by the speaker, see
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (dissenting opinion of Justice White) and J. Skelley
Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech, 85 YATE L.J. 1001, 1009 (1976).
59. See Michigan State Chamber v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 401 (W.D. Mich. 1986),
rev'd, 856 F.2d (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). See also Lillian
R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Reform, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1059 (1985) (asserting that Federal Election Campaign Act is
directed at "communicative significance" of speech in securing political favors).
60. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978), in which the majority
condemned the statute on this ground.
61. See Michael J. Garrison, CorporatePolitical Speech, Campaign Spending, and First
Amendment Doctrine, 27 Am. Bus. L.J. 163 (1989) (characterizing corporate speech regulation
as time, place or manner restriction); J. Skelley Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics:
Is the FirstAmendment an Obstacle to PoliticalEquality?, 83 CoLTJM. L. REv. 609, 640 (1982)

(same).
62. For arguments that differential effects should be deemed significant, see BeVier,
supra note 59, at 1061 (arguing that speech restrictions may be effectively nonneutral because
restrictions on certain activities are tied to political agendas opposed by spending reformers);
John R. Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political
Speech, 22 Amuz. L. Rv. 373, 416 (1980); Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 54, at 24850 (emphasizing nonneutrality of certain speaker-based restrictions, like those concerning
independent candidates).
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specialization of risk-bearing and management functions are particularly

suited to profit-seeking, capital-intensive endeavors requiring complex decisionmaking. 63 It follows that corporate speech restrictions peculiarly affect
advocacy of profit- and producer-oriented activity. This differential effect
is exacerbated by the MCFL rule that speech by issue-oriented corporations
is entitled to greater First Amendment protection than is speech by typical
profit-oriented companies.64 In short, where the statute draws these sorts of

lines, it should no longer be entitled to O'Brien's presumption of validity. 65
The most that can be said to justify applying only limited scrutiny to
corporate speech restrictions is that the corporate speech restrictions are not

the sort of classic content-oriented censorship involved in, for example, the
Indiana antipornography law struck down in American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut.6 But since O'Brien does not apply to corporate
speech restrictions, the content-neutrality of the speech restrictions does not
justify according special deference to the government justification.
III.

THnolms oF T E CORPORATION

The Supreme Court's application of the First Amendment to corporate

speech depends on its theory of the corporation. Specifically, it matters
whether the Court treats the corporation as a contract that is entitled to

the same constitutional treatment as other contracts, or whether it characterizes incorporation as a state privilege, or at least as a special sort of

contract for which mandatory legal rules are appropriate.
A.

Incorporation as a State Privilege

Justice Rehnquist argued in his Bellotti dissent that corporate political

speech is not protected simply because this is not one of the privileges states

63. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and
Investment Decisions, 14 J. FiN. EcoN. 101 (1985); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael
C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residu&il Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327, 330 (1983). As to
the association of limited liability with risk diversification and passive ownership, see Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L.
Rnv. 89, 99-101 (1985).
64. The differential effect persists even as to financial restrictions that apply to both
unions and corporations, because unions have an advantage in securing their members direct
political efforts. See Bolton, supra note 62, at 415-16. In any event, the regulation in Austin
singled out corporate activities and excepted unions.
65. For similar arguments, see the concurring opinion of Judge Posner in the lower
court, Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-1104 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub
nom., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), and the dissenting opinion of
Justice White (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens) in Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at
2471, emphasizing that the statute at issue did not ban all nudity, but only nudity in certain
contexts. Justice White's position on nude dancing contrasts interestingly with his refusal to
accept the same line of reasoning regarding corporate speech. See supra note 45.
66. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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have chosen to confer on their legal creations. 67 Although this position was
firmly rejected by the Bellotti majority, 6 the broad view of the state's
power to regulate corporate speech adopted in such recent cases as NR WC
(an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist) and Austin indicates that the
theory may be at least operating in the background.6 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has cited the "state-privilege" theory in other contexts. The Court
long ago held that corporate "privileges" are an important basis for the
special tax on corporations.7 0 It also used the theory of state creation of
corporate rights to justify state antitakeover legislation against a Commerce
Clause challenge. 71 As applied to the First Amendment, the theory is that
individuals securing the benefit of corporate features should be denied First
Amendment rights because these features are created by the states. If this
theory is accepted, it obviously would make unnecessary any further analysis
of the constitutional protection of corporate speech.
The state-creation or state-privilege theory is deeply flawed as a justification for denying First Amendment protection to corporate speech.
Corporate features are adopted by private contract rather than as a result
of legislative favor as they were at the time of Dartmouth College.7 2 The
state-privilege argument is not supported by the need for a state filing, any
more than it is in other contexts such as security agreements under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.73 Nor is limited liability state-created
since this feature can be achieved by both corporate and noncorporate firms

67. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's Bellotti
dissent).
68. See First Nat'l Bank v. Beliotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-80 nn.14-15.
69. The state-privilege argument was an important basis for the state court decision
upholding more than seventy years earlier the constitutionality of the Michigan statute involved
in Austin. See People v. Gansley, 158 N.W. 195 (1916).
70. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). The Court stated:
IThe tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with the
advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and which are not
enjoyed by private firms or individuals ... the continuity of the business, without
interruption by death or dissolution, the transfer of property interests by the
disposition of shares of stock, the advantages of business controlled and managed
by corporate directors, the general absence of individual liability, these and other
things inhere in the advantages of business thus conducted, which do not exist when
the same business is conducted by private individuals or partnerships.
Id. at 162. See also Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death
of Partnership, WAsH. U. L.Q. (forthcoming 1992).
71. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (stating that it
is "an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to create corporations,
to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their
shares").
72. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WAsH. L. Rv. 1, 8-9 (1990) [hereinafter Opting Out];
Harry N. Butier & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation,55 BROOK.
L. REv. 767, 774-75 (1989) [hereinafter Contract Clause].
73. See Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause, supra note 72, at 775.
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largely by private contract. 74 Even in tort cases limited liability can be

characterized as simply the state's refusal to extend vicarious liability beyond
the assets invested in a firm. That the state recognizes this feature of the
parties' contract no more establishes that corporations are state-created than

the nonliability of creditors for corporate torts shows that credit contracts
are "state-created.

75

Even if individuals doing business in the corporate form did derive their
powers from the state rather than from private contract, it still would not
follow that the states should be free from constitutional scrutiny should the

states make the privileges of incorporation conditional. First, such limitations may be regarded as an unconstitutional condition on corporate privileges. 76 Government exercise of power should be subject to constitutional

safeguards even if it only reduces the value of government-conferred privileges. 77 Second, the First Amendment protects interests other than those of
corporate speakers who have availed themselves of the corporate "privilege. '"7s

Justice White's Bellotti dissent articulated a rationale for limited constitutional protection of corporate speech that is at least superficially similar
to Rehnquist's state-creation theory. Justice White reasoned that states ought
to be able to prevent corporations from using their state-conferred advan-

tages to dominate the political process. This could be described as the
"Frankenstein" theory of corporate speech: The state should be able to
79
build limits into its creatures to prevent them from destroying its creators .

74. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD.
L. R~v. 80, 126-27 (1990) (noting that increased common law recognition of noncorporate
limited liability firms is breaking down legislative control of cdrporate features).
75. See id. at 127-29 (discussing limited liability with respect to involuntary creditors and
concluding that limited tort liability should not be regarded as privilege conferred by state).
76. See generally Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Littlefield v. City of Afton,
785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Richard A.
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 HAgv. L.
REv. 5 (1988); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
CoL m. L. Ray. 321 (1935); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 Htav. L. Rav. 1595 (1960).
This point was also made by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990):
Those individuals who form that type of voluntary association known as a corporation are, to be sure, given special advantages-notably, the immunization of their
personal fortunes from liability for the actions of the association-that the State is
under no obligation to confer. But so are other associations and private individuals
given all sorts of special advantages that the State need not confer, ranging from
tax breaks to contract awards to public employment to outright cash subsidies. It is
rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.
Id. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 1408. For an argument that conditioning limited liability on waiver
of contract clause protection is unconstitutional see Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause, supra
note 72, at 785-86.
77. See Epstein, supra note 76, at 102-03.
78. See infra section IV(A)(2).
79. See Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and CorporateFreedom: A Comment on First
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Unlike Justice Rehnquist's state-creation theory, however, Justice White's
theory seems to predicate the state's power not on the idea that corporate
speech is unprotected, but rather on a finding of harm to the political
process. 0
B.

The Regulatory Theory of the Corporation

The "state-privilege" argument is an artifact of history. But some
modern scholars adhere to a regulatory theory of the corporation under
which corporate contracts should be regulated more extensively than ordinary contracts.8" There is an extensive counter-literature advocating a contract theory of the corporation that shows how efficient contractual forms
82
have evolved within the corporate firm and that regulation may be costly.
As discussed throughout the remainder of this Article, the Supreme Court
implicitly has accepted the regulatory view by assuming that regulation is
necessary to remedy supposed inadequacies in private contracting within the
firm. This Article also asserts, consistent with the contract theory of the
corporation, that the Court's assumptions are unwarranted.
IV. A

THEORY OF FIRsT AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF CORPORATE
SPEECH: THE COSTS OF REGULATION

In evaluating the constitutionality of corporate speech restrictions, it is
necessary first to consider precisely why the First Amendment protects
corporate political speech at all. Justice Powell quickly disposed of this
question in Bellotti, noting that a corporation, as a "person," is surely
entitled to First Amendment protection.83 This assertion does not, however,
clarify the scope of constitutional protection of corporate speech. Because
a corporation has the legal attributes of a "person" only by operation of

National Bank v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1257 (1986) (comparing state's creation
of corporate form to state's creation of nuclear power). "Frankenstein" was used in another
sense by David L. Ratner, Corporationsand the Constitution, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 11, 29 (1981)
(criticizing Court's recognition of corporate free speech rights as endowing corporation with
human characteristics).
80. See infra text accompanying note 199.
81. See Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out, supra note 72, at 4 n.9 (extensively citing relevant
literature); Ribstein, supra note 74, at 84 n.11 (same).
82. See Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out, supra note 72, at 3 n.3 (citing relevant literature).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (discussing Supreme Court's protection of
corporate speech under BellottO. The language of the First Amendment seems straightforwardly
to protect corporate speech because, rather than providing for any particular object of
protection, it simply says that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
".... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person with its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886)
(holding that "person" includes corporations). See also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 (holding that
artificial persons are protected concerning denial of "liberty," including First Amendment
rights); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (same).
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law,14 the policies underlying the law ultimately determine the extent to
which a corporate person has particular attributes for purposes of constitutional protection.85 The Fifth Amendment illustrates this point, providing
that no "person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Although, as just noted, a corporation has long been held
to be a "person" for purposes of protection by the Due Process clause,
this holding was based on protecting shareholders' property rights. 6 It does
not necessarily follow, for example, that the shareholders' individual privacy
rights also extend into the corporation. Accordingly, the Court has held
that the self-incrimination clause protects only individuals, and so cannot
be used to protect a custodian of corporate records from having to produce
87
those records.
By the same token, even if the corporation is a constitutional "person,"
it does not necessarily follow that its speech is accorded the same protection
as individuals' speech. The degree of protection depends on the application
of the balancing test discussed in Part II. Accordingly, it is necessary to
look beyond the literal text of the Constitution to determine whether, and
to what extent, corporate speech is entitled to protection.
This Part develops a theory of First Amendment protection of corporate
speech. It begins in subpart A by identifying the interests represented by
the "corporation" that potentially deserve First Amendment protection,
including the interests of managers, shareholders, and listeners. Subpart B,
building on the economic theory of interest groups, demonstrates precisely
84. Indeed, the legal concept of the corporation has fluctuated throughout history, from

the original concept of the corporation as a state-created entity, through the concept of the
corporation of an aggregate of its owners, and finally to a concept that has mixed aggregate
and entity elements. For a history of concepts of the corporation, see Morton J. Horwitz,
Santa ClaraRevisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. Rav. 173 (1985).
For other histories building largely on Horwitz, see William W. Bratton, The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectivesfrom History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1989); Gregory
A. Mark, Comment, The Personificationof the Business Corporation in American Law, 54
U. Cm. L. Rav. 1441 (1987); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKEa L.J.
201.
85. See I ALLAN R. BROM3ERG & LARRY E. RiBsTEiN, BROMBERG AND RIBsTEIN ON
PARTNERsHIP § 1.03 (1988 and Supp.); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate
Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926). Some commentators argue that legal abstractions
like concepts of the corporation "have determinate legal or political significance." See Horwitz,
supra note 84, at 175-76; Millon, supra note 84, at 243. Perhaps acceptance of concepts of
the corporation, like that of metaphors generally, contributes marginally to acceptance of
particular legal results or theories. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
150-52 (1990). But the relationship between linguistic forms and legal results is complex and
dynamic. Constitutional results do not depend straightforwardly on which metaphor of the
corporation is accepted.
86. See Horwitz, supra note 84; O'Kelley, infra note 88; Mark, supra note 84.
87. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911). In Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), the Court carried this distinction
to the extreme of denying the self-incrimination privilege to production of documents by the
sole shareholder of a corporation.
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how these interests are affected by regulation that only restricts corporate
activity while leaving individuals free to speak in other ways.
A.

Identification of Protected Interests

The corporation, as a nexus of contracts, obviously cannot be "speaking." Accordingly, corporate speech should be constitutionally protected
only to the extent necessary to protect the rights of individuals connected
with the corporation." In closely held corporations with decentralized management, the owner-managers usually are speaking for the corporation. In
publicly held corporations, however, .there is some question as to who the
speakers are, and therefore who, if anyone, should be protected by the
First Amendment. Before considering the extent of constitutional protection
that should be accorded corporate speech, it is necessary first to consider
precisely whose First Amendment interests are at stake, particularly in
publicly traded corporations.
1. Corporate Speakers: Managers and Claimants
In a publicly held corporation with centralized management, corporate
speech, like other corporate conduct, originates from the managers rather
than the shareholders. If the managers speak as agents of the shareholders
or others in the corporation, the relevant protected interest belongs to the
shareholders the managers represent. If managers speak on their own behalf,
their own speech interest should be constitutionally protected. This is clearest
when managers' speech is supported by their compensation paid directly in
money or indirectly by the corporation's authorization of the authorizing
managers' use of corporate funds for "personal" speech. 9 Moreover,
managers' speech should be protected even if they are spending shareholders'
money without authority.9° First Amendment protection does not depend
on the legitimacy of the source of the funds used to support the speech.
Such a distinction would be impossible to make, because even direct
compensation may be "excessive" in the sense that it results from managers'
abuse of their power to fix their own pay. In any event, this is strictly a
matter of contracting within the firm. Perhaps, to aid contracting between

88. For commentary expressing this view, see Victor Brudney, Business Corporations
and Stockholders' Rights under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (discussing
state's ability to protect speech rights of minority shareholders); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The
Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the
Corporationafter First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347 (1979) (discussing Supreme
Court's initial recognition of constitutional rights of corporations based on rationale of
protecting incorporators' property invested in firm); Ratner, supra note 79, at 21 (noting that
Constitution protects only individuals involved in enterprise).
89. This point is recognized even by a prominent critic of corporate speech rights. See
C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 219-20 (1989).
90. For a contrary view, see Brudney, supra note 88; Schneider, supra note 79, at 1266.
See also CARLEs E. LINDBLOM, POLmCS AND MARKETS 192-94 (1977) (discussing unconstrained
ability of businessmen to draw on corporate resources to support political activities).
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shareholders and managers, the state should be able to regulate this activity
notwithstanding the First Amendment. But that relates to government
interests justifying the regulation, and not to determining whether there is
any constitutionally protected interest. 91
If the managers speak as agents, shareholders might be regarded as the
principals because of their powers to elect and remove directors and their
powers to sue managers who fail to manage according to what is in the
shareholders' interests. However, several problems exist with characterizing
shareholders as the principals. First, corporate speech expresses shareholder
views only in a very attenuated sense. Shareholders arguably approve
corporate speech because they can constrain the managers to speak on their
behalf through such devices as fiduciary duty rules and the power to vote
the directors out of office. But the business judgment rule provides broad
latitude for corporate political activity. 92 And because management changes
are costly, shareholders will undertake such a change to constrain only very
costly corporate speech. In other words, the managers' speech is not so
much authorized by the shareholders as not significantly contrary to their
interests. 93 Moreover, most individuals either hold a diversified portfolio of
investments or invest in corporations only indirectly through institutions
such as mutual funds. 94 In either event, investors normally care little about
the internal affairs of individual companies or statements or expenditures
made by their managers.
Second, managers may speak for parties other than shareholders to the
corporation's contracts. It is true that directors normally are elected only
by shareholders, while creditors and others rely on the corporation's performance of specific contractual obligations to pay wages, repay debt and
the like. The shareholders' contracts therefore seem to differ from those of
other corporate claimholders in a way that arguably makes shareholders
uniquely responsible for managers' speech. But other claimants can check
managerial conduct. For example, creditors may have significant monitoring
rights, particularly in insolvent or nearly insolvent firms. 95 Workers may
91. For criticism of the shareholder-protection rationale for regulating corporate speech,
see infra section V(A).
92. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968) (sustaining business decision motivated partly by nonbusiness objectives). See also A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d
581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953) (holding charitable gift not ultra vires).
93. Perhaps as large institutional shareholders become more active in corporate governance, corporate speech can be more closely identified with specific shareholders. For a
comprehensive reexamination of the passive-shareholder view of public corporation governance
see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1990). At
this point, new trends in shareholder monitoring have not developed to the point where large
shareholders can be identified with specific corporate activities.
94. Cf. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1246-47 (1983) (citing
these circumstances as undercutting constitutional protection of corporate speech).
95. NICHOLAS WOLFSON, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SEC, in CORPORATE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 111, 123 (1990) (questioning whether creditors should be
distinguished from shareholders since both groups are investors who differ only regarding the
form of their contracts).
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have considerable say through their power to strike or quit. Moreover, the
legal recognition of shareholders as principals recently has been breaking
down. Some commentators argue that managers should act on behalf of
stakeholders other than shareholders, particularly in connection with resisting takeovers 6 There is some case law support for this view97 and many
state statutory provisions permit or require directors to consider nonshareholder constituencies in making corporate control decisions.9 8
Thus, in light of both the attenuated shareholder responsibility for
corporate speech and the managers' emerging responsibilities to "stakeholders," corporate speech may represent the views primarily of managers rather
than of any particular nonmanagerial participants in the corporate enterprise.
However, it does not follow from shareholders' attenuated role as
corporate speakers that corporate speech deserves only weak First Amendment protection. Such a result could be based only on a strong regulatory
theory of the corporation under which agency problems merit mandatory
rules. Instead, any such agency problems should be analyzed from the
standpoint of justifying state interference with a constitutionally protected
interest, rather than negating the existence of that interest.9
2.

Protecting Rights of Non-Speakers

Speaker-based protection is neither the only nor even the most widely
accepted theory of First Amendment protection.10 The most important early

96. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 448 (asserting that board
should be viewed as "mediator" to enforce implicit contracts among shareholders and other
constituencies); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees, 45 HArv.
L. REv. 1145 (1932); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw.
101, 120 (1979); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205
(1988) (advocating fiduciary duties to bondholders); Lewis D. Solomon & Kathleen J. Collins,
Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate, 12 J.
CoRP. L. 331 (1987); William H. Steinbrink, Management'sResponse to the Takeover Attempt,
28 CAsE W. REs. L. Ray. 882 (1978).
97. See Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding defensive stock
issuance partly on ground that the target, a large urban newspaper, was "quasi-public
institution"); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Shottenstein, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,872 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (holding that corporation, acting on behalf of unsecured creditors, could sue directors
for approving LBO on ground that board had duty to determine -whether LBO was in best
interests of corporation as well as shareholders); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F.
Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding "pension parachute" that vests "excess" funds in
pension plan to assure workers that such funds will not be used by bidder).
98. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE
§ 23-1-35-1(d) (1989); Mo. Ray. STAT. § 351.347 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRn'. L. § 717(b)
(McKinney's 1992); Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Baldwin 1988).
99. See infra section V(A) (discussing proposition that state law control of agency costs
does not, in fact, justify the regulation).
100. Perhaps the leading proponent of the speaker-based protection theory is Professor
C. Edwin Baker, who argues that speech is protected to the extent that it promotes the
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basis of First Amendment rights is J.S. Mill's argument that free speech is

essential to the discovery of the truth. 1 1 As Justices Holmes and Brandeis
said in their famous Abrams dissent, "the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas.... [T]he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."' 1

Because facts are inherently subjective and "truth" is unattainable, free
speech is important to help people make decisions in a democratic society.
This philosophy could be extended to all decisions free people make for
1 or narrowed to political decisionsY" 4 In the words of one
themselves, 03
prominent commentator:
[Tihe purpose of [the First Amendment] is not to protect the need
of Hitler 'or Lenin or Engels or Marx "to express his opinions on

matters vital to him if life is to be worth living." We are not
defending the financial interests of a publisher, or a distributor, or
even of a writer. We are saying that the citizens of the United
States will be fit to govern themselves under their own institutions
only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly everything that can
be said in favor of those institutions, everything that can be said
against them. 10
These nonspeaker-based theories of First Amendment protection would
support constitutional protection for corporate speech apart from protection
autonomy of the individual. See generally Baker, supra note 89. Baker would refuse to protect
corporate speech, but he would do so not because corporate speech generally does not represent
the expression of the shareholders' views, but because it is market-driven and therefore does
not serve individual autonomy. See id. at 219-24; C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A
Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. Rav. 1, 34-40 (1976); C. Edwin Baker,
Realizing Self-Realization: CorporatePolitical Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646 (1982). The peculiarly sweeping nature of this limitation is
criticized in Shiffrin, supra note 94, at 1249-51.
101. See JOHN STuART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1st ed. 1859). Another famous early
source of First Amendment theory is JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA-FOR THE LIBERTY OF
UNLICENSED PRINriNO (1644):
And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth
be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her
strength. Let her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in
a free and open encounter?
Id. at 51-52. For another prominent theory emphasizing the truth-discovering role of free
speech, see Emerson, supra note 43 (stating that "attainment of truth" is one of four
fundamental values underlying right to freedom of expression, along with "self-fulfillment,"
"participation in decision-making" and achieving "balance between stability and change").
102. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
103. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982)
(advocating "self-realization" theory of First Amendment).
104. See ALEXANDER MaIKLjosHN, FRE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. FouND. REs. J.
521 (arguing that freedom of speech is important in checking abuse of official power); Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971)
(asserting that First Amendment is intended to protect constitutional processes of government
and should not be extended beyond this sphere).
105. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 104, at 91.
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of self-expression by individuals connected with the corporation. Significantly, this was the theory that Justice Powell stressed in Bellotti, saying:
The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.106
Justice Powell's Bellotti opinion endorsed in other ways the inherent value
of speech. He noted that the recognition of First Amendment rights of
corporations engaged in the communications business were based partly on
the First Amendment's "role in affording the public access to discussion,
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas"'1 7 rather than on
the idea that the First Amendment protects only property rights.108 In Austin,
Justice Powell also supported the informational role of the First Amendment, recognizing the rights of corporations to engage in commercial speech.' 9
Indeed, Justice Powell noted that, by limiting corporations to views "materially affecting" their business, the legislature exacerbated the First Amendment problem by attempting "to give one side of a debatable public question
an advantage in expressing its views to the people .... ,0
The Supreme Court has not, however, completely rejected a speakerbased theory of the First Amendment. The Court has distinguished expenditures and contributions primarily on the speaker-based ground that the
former is the more expressive activity."' Additionally, Justice White's dissenting opinion in Bellotti emphasized the "self-fulfillment" function of the
First Amendment,12 a position that seems to have gained acceptance in
post-Bellotti corporate speech cases that focus on whether the speech represents shareholder views. But Justice Powell's explicit recognition of the
broad social interests furthered by free speech remains a significant basis
of constitutional protection of corporate speech.

106. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). Later, citing Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), Justice
Powell stated that a "commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much
because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in the
'free flow of commercial information."' Id. at 783. See also Lillian R. BeVier, Justice Powell
and the First Amendment's "Societal Function". A PreliminaryAnalysis, 68 VA. L. REv. 177
(1982) (reviewing Justice Powell's focus in Bellotti on democratic process as distinguished from
individual rights).
107. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (footnote omitted).
108. The Austin Court also held that the statute's distinction of media corporations did
not violate equal protection because, even if the press was not constitutionally entitled to
greater protection, the state could recognize the press' important role in the collection and
dissemination of information. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
-,

110 S. Ct. 1391, 1401-02 (1990).

109. Id. For an important commercial speech case stressing the inherent value of speech
to society rather than the self-expression by the speaker see Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
110. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785 (footnote omitted).
111. See supra note 7.
112. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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All of this is not to suggest that speakers' rights can be wholly separated
from the rights of others affected by restricting speech. The speaker has no
practical interest in "speech" that no one hears, and the listener cares who
is uttering the speech. Nevertheless, the interests of speakers and others
may differ. This is particularly true in the corporate context, where the
speech may be valuable even if there is no clearly identifiable speaker."'
B.

The Effect of Corporate Speech Restrictions: An Interest Group
Analysis

Even if there are individual interests at stake in protecting corporate
speech, some members of the Court have asserted that these interests are
trivial because regulating corporate speech leaves individuals connected with
the corporation free to support political action directly.1 4 However, this
argument ignores the economics of interest groups, as well as the important
effects of corporate political activity restrictions on both corporate speakers
and on society.
1. Effect on Speakers
Interest group theory is a positive theory of the forces that actually
produce government action, as distinguished from normative theories of
how government ought to act.115 Because interest group theory models how
government works, it is obviously relevant to interpretations of the First
Amendment based on the importance of free speech to constitutional
processes of democratic government.
Under interest group theory, politicians broker wealth transfers (such
as subsidies, tax reductions, and trade barriers) to interest groups that
function as demanders of legislation. 16 These groups pay politicians (in the
form of votes, contributions, expenditures, junkets, employment for politicians' associates, and so forth) to effect these transfers. A group will pay
no more than $1 to receive $1 of transfers and, by a parity of reasoning,

113. See infra section IV(B)(2) (discussing social effects of corporate speech restrictions).
114. See Austin, 494 U.S. at -,
110 S. Ct. at 1398; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 807-09
(White, J., dissenting). Restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures and contributions also
leave corporations free to engage in other political activity such as lobbying, but this is clearly
not a full substitute for the restricted activity.
115. See ROBERT E. McCoIumcK & ROBERT D. ToaisoN, PouimcaNs, LEoISLATIONS AND
Ta ECONOmy 3-4 (1981). The seminal article on interest group theory is George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BEu. J. EcoN. & Momr. Sci. 3 (1971). Other important
early articles on interest group theory include Sam Peltzman, Toward A More General Theory
of Regulation, 19 J. L. & EcoN. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & Moui. Scr. 335 (1974).
116. Under an important extension of interest group theory, politicians function as active
participants rather than merely as brokers, receiving payments by threatening regulation. See
Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation,
16 J. LEo. STUD. 101 (1987).
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will suffer a $1 transfer if it would have to pay more than $1 to avoid the
transfer.
An important point both for interest group theory in general and for
corporate speech in particular is that wealth transfers occur because of
differing organization costs among interest groups. An interest group that
receives $1 benefit from a wealth transfer will pay $1 less the cost of
receiving the benefit. This cost includes resources expended to learn the
effects of legislation and to identify and communicate with other potential
17
group members who may be affected.
If these organizational costs were the only ones that mattered, larger
groups often would have an advantage over smaller groups because scale
economies of organization would cause costs to increase more slowly than
benefits with increases in size. But scale economies of large groups are
offset by the "free rider" problem: while benefits are shared by all members
of the group, the costs may be incurred by a few organizers who cannot
8
cheaply force the other group members to bear their share of the costs."
Thus, although total benefits to large groups may increase more quickly
with the increasing size of the group than the organization costs identified
in the previous paragraph, the costs of overcoming the free rider problem
rise just as rapidly with the increasing size of the group. This explains why
relatively small interest groups, such as those consisting of producers, often
can outbid much larger groups consisting of most voters." 9
As an example of the foregoing, suppose group A can gain a gross
marginal benefit of $1 from a wealth transfer at a total marginal organizational cost (including the costs of overcoming the free rider problem) of
$.50.120 Suppose group B will lose $1 from the transfer and has organizational costs of $.60. In this situation, group A can "bid" $.50 to effect the
transfer, while group B can bid no more than $.40.121

117. See McComacK & TouLsoN, supra note 115, at 17; Stigler, supra note 115, at 10-

13. This information cost factor in interest group formation links Stigler's interest group theory
with his seminal work in information theory. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of
Information, 69 J. PoL. ECON. 213 (1961).
118. This problem was emphasized in the pioneering work on group formation, MANcUR
OrsoN, THE LoGic or CoJ. crnv ACMION (1965). For some other discussions of the importance
of free riding in interest group theory, see McComa.UcK & TorIuSON, supra note 115, at 17-18;

Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98
QUART. J. ECON. 371, 377 (1983); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA.
L. REv. 339 (1988).
119. Mancur Olson refers to the latter as "latent" groups. See OLSON, supra note 118,
at 48-52.
120. Note that there may be no "free rider" costs if a single member will incur a
substantial loss or gain from a wealth transfer without any organizational effort to devise

incentives or penalties. Also note that marginalorganizational costs of seeking a wealth transfer
normally will be lower for existing than for- forming groups.
121. The following graph, drawn from graphs in McCoRMICK & TOLLsON, supra note
115, at 19-20, captures these insights:
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A final factor in the interest group analysis critical to the corporate
speech issue is that many interest groups, including corporations, have
important nonpolitical features, such as mutual assistance of the members
or profit-making activities.'2 These groups can support political activities

dollars per
time period

FIGURE I
This graph assumes wealth transfers worth $1. The horizontal line at $1 is what all groups
would pay in the absence of organizational costs to effect and avoid transfers. Under this
zero-organizational-cost assumption there would be no wealth transfers. More generally, wealth
transfers depend on heterogeneous organization costs. See id. at 25-27.
The graph reflects that groups with more than $1 of organization costs would "pay" less
than 0 for $1 of wealth transfers. The downward sloping demand curve (D) reflects what
interest groups with different organization costs would pay for $1 of wealth transfers. Groups
with demand prices between P* and P*-f cannot outbid groups with demand prices higher
than P* but, given the costs (f) of running the system, they can bid enough to resist the
transfer. The upward sloping supply curve (S) is simply the demand curve turned around and
increased at every point by a constant amount (f) which represents the direct costs of operating
the political transfer system. The intersection of S and D (P) is a transfer point: groups with
organization costs less than (above and to the left of) this point will pay for wealth transfers
provided by interest groups with organization costs more than (below and to the right of) P*f.
122. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 206-10, this factor applies fully to both
for-profit and "ideological" corporations.
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out of the revenues generated by their nonpolitical activities in excess of
the costs of these activities. Such organizations have low marginal costs of
political organization because they obtain collective goods as a "by-product"
of their organization for noncollective reasons.'2 Because of this factor,
corporate speakers may be more likely to be at the left of the transfer point

(that is, will receive rather than supply wealth transfers) than some other
groups or individuals who do not speak through the corporation.
It follows from the above analysis that regulations limiting corporate
speech may have a significant adverse effect on the level of political activity
because they force corporate participants to incur additional organization
costs in order to act collectively. 124 This makes the corporate mechanism a
nontrivial mechanism of expression, and therefore raises significant First
Amendment concerns. Ironically, this justification for constitutional protection occurs precisely because of a factor the Supreme Court has emphasized
as supporting restrictionson corporate speech: the combination of political

and nonpolitical benefits. 25
Restrictions on corporate speech do not, of course, make it impossible
for corporate participants to express corporate views individually. Individual
managers or shareholders may act politically both independently and through
political action committees. 2 6 Election laws currently permit corporations
to use treasury funds to administer PACs,' 27 and there are many wealthy

and active business-oriented political action committees.' 28 Moreover, cor-

123. Mancur Olson refers to this as the "by-product" effect. See OLSoN, supra note 118,
at 132-67. See also McCoRaMICK & ToLasoN, supra note 115, at 17; Posner, supra note 115,
at 342-43. Note that while the organizations may have low, or zero, marginal costs of generating
funds for political purposes, they may have high opportunity costs of using the funds for
political purposes. See infra text accompanying note 210.
124. This is relevant not only to speech by corporate participants but to these participants'
associational freedom. For a discussion of associational freedom and application to both
commercial and noncommercial firms, see Wolfson, supra note 2. For the Supreme Court's
recognition that restrictions on political contributions and expenditures may impinge associational freedoms, see supra note 7.
125. This was an important basis for the Austin Court's distinction of MCFL. See Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
-, 110 S. Ct. at 1391, 1398-1400
(1990).
126. The Supreme Court held that statutory limits on PAC expenditures were unconsti-

tutional in Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee,
470 U.S. 480, 483 (1985). See supra note 29. The activities of such business-oriented groups
as the Business Roundtable (consisting of chief executives of large corporations) and the United
Shareholders of America might be sufficiently "expressive" of underlying member views to be
protected under the MCFL rationale. This result is, of course, somewhat doubtful in light of
Austin's refusal to protect the activities of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.
127. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1988) (exempting from restrictions on corporate and
union expenditures and contributions amounts paid for "the establishment, administration,
and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political
purposes ....

).

128. For reports and studies of corporate PAC activities, see 1987-88
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porations can engage directly in such political activities as lobbying and
sponsoring political advertisements, and can achieve similar goals through
nonpolitical activity such as litigation. But merely because corporate participants can employ these alternative means of expressing their views does
not justify foreclosing one of the alternatives. Nonincorporated groups must
incur additional organization costs. 29 Thus, at the margin, political representation of corporate interests will be reduced. Second, the groups that
are formed and whose activities are protected will represent different interests
than the corporations whose speech is restricted. 30 Finally, corporate activities other than direct contributions and expenditures may have limited
effect. For example, because contributions buy access to candidates, lobbying without such contributions is likely to be less effective. 3'
2.

Social Effects

Corporate speech restrictions may affect society as a whole, not just
corporate participants. This is relevant
in light of the listener-rights basis
2
of corporate speech protection.1
First, restricting corporate political activity could cause laws to be
inefficient by permitting noncorporate groups to dominate the political
process. This concern is discussed below as the other side of the argument
that restrictions on corporate speech are justified to prevent inefficiency
resulting from imbalance.'
Second, interest groups can constrain politicians to act in their constituents' interests.' Because challengers need access to funds from interest
groups to fund the costly campaigns necessary to unseat incumbents, campaign spending by challengers is particularly influential in determining

CoMMISSIoN REPORT ON 1990 CONGREssIoNAL ELECTON SPENDING (Feb. 22, 1991); LARRY J.

SABATO, PAC POWER (1984).

129. See Austin, 494 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1425 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Michael J. Malbin, Looking Back at the Future of Campaign Finance Reform, in MONEY AND
PouTcs IN THE UNrTED STATES 247, n.21 (Michael Malbin, ed. 1984) (noting low contribution
ratios for employees solicited by corporate PACs).
130. As a result, restrictions on corporate speech may skew corporate political activity
towards managers' interests and away from shareholders' interests. See infra text accompanying
notes 160-66.
131. See SABATO, supra note 128, at 126-28.
132. See supra section IV(A)(2).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
134. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest
and Public Agenda, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGOAIZATION 167, 186-87 (1990). Among other things,
unconstrained legislators may act consistently with ideological preferences that are not shared
by their constituents. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent IdeologicalBehavior
of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON.
103, 103-06 (1990) (showing evidence that ideological voting of politicians is partly function
of ability of voters to form coalitions, measured in study by degree to which voters in state
conform to national political norm as indicating their heterogeneity).
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election outcomes."' Accordingly, laws that restrict interest group activity
tend to favor incumbents. 136 This, in turn, makes incumbents more secure
in office and more able to indulge their personal ideologies or other
preferences instead of constituents' preferences. This insight supports Justice
Scalia's view in his Austin dissent that corporations are an important private
check against abuse of official power.137 This reasoning also accords with a
positive economic theory of the First Amendment. If people think they can
38
win a race for political favor, they may oppose restrictions on lawmaking.
But the constitution reflects the fact that most people know in advance, at
the time the time constitutional restrictions are enacted, that they will be
39
hurt by laws that favor incumbent politicians.
Third, restricting corporate speech may impose social costs by reducing
the quantity and balance of information made available to voters. This
consideration is particularly relevant to restrictions on campaign expenditures
like those upheld in Austin. Because of the free-rider problem, voters often
have little incentive to acquire information about political choices. 140 This
135. For data showing the effects of challenger and incumbent spending, see GARY C.
JACOBSON, MONEY n CONGRESSioNAL ELECTIONS at 48-49 (1980); Gary C. Jacobson, Practical
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform: An Incumbent ProtectionAct?, 24 PUB. PoL'Y
1 (1976).
136. For evidence that corporate political action committees tend to support incumbents
see Jacobson, supra note 135; Bernadette A. Budde, Business-Related Political Action Committees, 3 J.L. & POL. 449, 455 (1987); Gary C. Jacobson, Money and Votes Reconsidered:
CongressionalElections, 1972-82, 47 PuB. CHOICE 7 (1985); Gerald Keim & Asghar Zardkoohi,
Looking for Leverage in PAC Markets: Corporateand Labor Contributions Considered, 58
PUB. CHOICE 21 (1988). See also BeVier, supra note 59, at 1046 (noting that campaign finance
laws serve incumbents' self-interest). On the other hand, corporate PACs do give significant
support to challengers. See Eismeier & Pollock, Political Action Committees: Varieties of
Organization and Strategy in MONEY AND POLITICS IN

TH

UNITED STATES 131 (M. Malbin,

ed. 1984). Also, irrespective of general tendencies, the fact remains that incumbents would be
constrained by challengers' potential for tapping corporate money. See Jacobson, supra, 47
PuB. CHoicE at 53.

137. Justice Scalia quoted de Toqueville:
Governments ... should not be the only active powers; associations ought, in
democratic nations, to stand in lieu of those powerful private individuals whom the
equality of conditions has swept away.

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, -,
110 S. Ct. 1391, 1416
(quoting ALEXIS DE ToQuEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERCA 109 (Bradley ed. 1948)). See also
JA s CouEM", THE AsYMmmnuC SociETY 51-55 (1982) (arguing that private organizations
protect individuals from state power). Note that these arguments focus on private associations'
ability to protect individuals from the "state." The more important point concerns protecting
constituents form government agents.
138. This assumes that the expected gross gains exceed expected deadweight rent-seeking
costs. For a discussion of rent-seeking costs, see supra Part III.
139. See Fred S. McChesney, A Positive Regulatory Theory of the First Amendment, 20
CONN. L. REv. 355, 366-67 (1988) (stating this as explanation for First Amendment protection
of political speech).
140. See generally ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOmC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). See
also Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the FirstAmendment,
105 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1991) (arguing that First Amendment protection offsets public goods
aspects of information that could cause under-investment in lobbying against regulation).
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is one of the factors that lets relatively small interest groups obtain wealth
transfers from much larger groups with higher organizational (including free
rider) costs. Permitting expenditures by all competing groups can result in
a more informed electoral choice, and thus benefit voters generally even
more than it benefits the competing interest group. 14' This is true whether
the expenditures are in a referendum campaign, as in Bellotti, or in a
candidate election, as in Austin. Indeed, expenditures by interest groups

may be more important in the latter context as a way of exposing candidate
42
contributions by other interest groups.
V.

JUSTFYING CORPORATE SPEE CH REGULATO1N

Given the substantial First Amendment interests at stake, and accordingly a high B in the Posner formulation,' 43 in regulating corporate speech,
the question then becomes whether this regulation can be justified by a
sufficient state interest in regulation, PL in Posner's formula. Evaluation
of some possible rationales for restricting corporate speech, including those
given in the Supreme Court corporate speech cases, demonstrates that they
do not justify regulation under the pragmatic approach this Article applies.
A central problem with all of these rationales is that they are based on a
regulatory theory of the corporation that underestimates the ability of private
contracting to minimize agency costs related to corporate speech. Accordingly, these purported state interests do not outweigh the significant First
Amendment interests that might be compromised by regulation.
A.

Shareholder Protection and Agency Costs

Restrictions on corporate campaign contributions have been justified by
some members of the Supreme Court as protecting shareholders from having
to support views with which they disagree. 44 Justice White's Bellotti dissent
analogized corporate speech to compulsory flag salutes in schools and the

141. See Phillip Nelson, PoliticalInformation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 315, 327 (1976), arguing
that "Even though contributions are being made for the most pernicious of purposes, the
majority benefits. The payoff to other minorities is reduced more than the gain of the new
contributors." Nelson adds: "One ... expects limits on campaign financing to strongly favor
minority interests against the majority." Id. at 329.
For an example of this phenomenon, see Don Phillips, "Bringing Truck Lobby to
Screeching Halt," WASH. POST, June 15, 1991, at Al (pointing out that railroads' advertising
campaign showing danger of triple-trailer trucks offsets power of trucking lobby).
142. Justice Scalia's Austin dissent makes the point that the information that the corporation is behind the expenditure is relevant to voters.
Why should the Michigan voters in the 93d House District be deprived of the
information that private associations owning and operating a vast percentage of the
industry of the State, and employing a large number of its citizens, believe that the
election of a particular candidate is important to their prosperity?
Austin, 494 U.S. at -,
110 S. Ct. at 1416.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 47 & 48.
144. See Bolton, supra note 62, at 377, noting early characterization of corporate speech
as "embezzlement."
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use of employees' compulsory union dues to finance political contributions. 41 Justice White also reasoned that the state has an interest in ensuring
that shareholders will not be deterred from investing in corporations because
of unwillingness to support corporate political views.' In NWRC, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, said that one of two purposes
of federal restrictions on campaign contributions is to protect corporate
shareholders or union dues contributors "from having that money used to
support political candidates to whom they may be opposed."1 47 Also, Justice
Brennan's Austin concurrence emphasized the state's "compelling interest
in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do
1
not wish to contribute to the Chamber's political message."
Before evaluating the Court's theory, it would be helpful precisely to
define the issue in economic terms. The shareholder-protection argument
essentially asserts that restrictions on corporate political activity reduce a
type of "agency cost" arising between corporate shareholders and corporate
managers. Agency cost refers to the costs a principal incurs in delegating
to an agent discretionary power over the principal's resources. The agent
may be tempted to take self-interested actions that impose costs on the
principal. The principal has some incentive to reduce these costs by monitoring the agent or by establishing incentive devices. The agent also has an
incentive to offer a bond by investing in assets (including reputation) that
will be forfeited if the agent misbehaves. The parties to an agency relationship can be expected to contract so as to minimize the total of (1) monitoring
costs; (2) bonding costs; and (3) residual losses imposed by agents on
principals because of misaligned incentives despite monitoring and bonding. 49 Because the parties will not willingly incur monitoring and bonding
costs in excess of the amount these costs save in residual agency loss, their
interests normally will be imperfectly aligned and the agent will have some
incentive to benefit herself at the principal's expense.
Managers' use of corporate funds to invest in speech contrary to
investors' interests or beliefs can be regarded as a type of agency cost.5 0
145. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 at 813-18 (1978). The flag salute case
Justice White relied on is Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), discussed id. at
813. The union dues cases are Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). Justice White also noted that
the Court had construed the Corrupt Practices Act as having the purpose of ensuring minority
shareholder or union consent to corporate and union political views. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
819-20 (discussing United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)).
146. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818-19.
147. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208
(1982) (citing U.S. v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948)).
148. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, -,
110 S. Ct. 1391,
1406 (1990). Like Justice White, Justice Brennan also relied in part on Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740 (1961).
149. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (characterizing
agency costs as including these elements).
150. There is agency cost even if the shareholders do not disagree with the speech, but
do disagree with this use of corporate funds as opposed to other, more profitable uses.
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Managers' and shareholders' interests are, in fact, likely to diverge regarding
speech. Managers may advocate pet causes that do not relate to the
corporation. Even speech that is apparently on behalf of the corporation
may represent a divergence of interest because shareholders usually hold
diversified portfolios of shares while managers often heavily invest human
and financial capital in their corporations."' Thus, managers may want to
advocate wealth transfers to their own firms from others, while shareholders
would regard such transfers as shifting wealth within their portfolios which
imposes deadweight transfer costs. It is not even clear that shareholders
would favor wealth transfers from noncorporate groups to corporations
because they may lose as members of transferee groups (i.e., as consumers
or employees).
The parties to the corporation have the incentive to invest in devices
that minimize this divergence of interest up to the point that the cost of
the devices exceeds the costs saved by instituting the controls. The cost of
the devices could include direct enforcement costs or, less directly, the
reduction of benefits from turning control of corporate speech over to
managers. A law restricting political activities on behalf of corporations by
corporate managers would accomplish the same purpose. Accordingly, corporate speech restrictions arguably serve rational economic goals (L in the
Posner formula).
Notwithstanding these considerations, the shareholder-protection argument is a weak justification for corporate speech restrictions because the
shareholder-protection rationale, consistent with the regulatory theory of
the corporation, minimizes regulatory cost as well as the effectiveness of
private solutions to the agency cost problem.
1. Legal Rules Protecting Shareholders are Unnecessary
There is a serious question whether shareholders need the sort of
protection they are supposedly getting from statutes restricting corporate
political activity. In the first place, the cost of corporate political activity
is likely to be very low because most public corporation shareholders are
indifferent to the speech of "their" corporations." 2 As Justice Scalia pointed
out in his Austin dissent, even if shareholders are concerned with what the
corporation is saying, they easily can protect themselves from unwanted
speech by selling when they disagree."' Contrary to what Justice Brennan
asserts, this usually would not cause "financial sacrifice.""14 Because the

151. For discussions of this disparity of interests in the takeover setting, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Shareholders vs. Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MicH. L. REv.
1 (1986); David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in
Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. Rav. 701 (1987).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
153. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, -,
110 S. Ct. 1391,
1412 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1405 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation and footnote omitted).
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public corporations to which the shareholder-protection rationale supposedly
applies are traded in efficient securities markets, the sale price reflects at
least all current public information concerning the stock. Although there
may be undisclosed inside information that in hindsight might make the
sale look ill-timed, it is equally possible that such information would make
the timing of the sale look fortuitous. 5 In other words, at the time of a
speech-motivated trade, the expected value of undisclosed information is
likely to be zero. Thus, the stock and its market price are largely fungible
in the absence of significant costs of sale or expenses resulting from the
need to readjust the shareholder's portfolio.
Corporate managers might engage in speech that is so objectionable to
1 56
all investors that it reduces the market price of the corporation's stock.
In this situation, exit by an individual shareholder is not a complete remedy
because the exiting shareholder receives only the reduced market price. The
shareholders have other options in this setting, including mounting a proxy
contest or tender offer to remove the managers or suing for breach of
fiduciary duty. 157 In other words, shareholders have the familiar alternatives
of "exit" and "voice" as means of obtaining redress.?5 That neither
alternative is fully effective, particularly in public corporations, does not
necessarily justify statutes forbidding corporate political speech. Because
managers' speech rarely will be very costly, the costs to shareholders of
prohibiting corporate speech probably outweigh the benefits to the shareholders of forbidding corporate political speech.
Accordingly, a significant difference exists between the plight of a
shareholder and that of a union member who disagrees with use of his
compulsory union dues. Moreover, even if the costs of voice and exit were
comparable in the two situations, the shareholders' choice of investment
contracts among many virtually fungible opportunities is far broader than
the unionist's choice of labor contracts. Even the rare shareholder who
cares about corporate speech could choose to invest only in firms that did

155. Even if the shareholder has inside information, this does not affect the analysis. If
the information is positive, the shareholder need only hold until it is revealed. If the information
is negative, the shareholder has another incentive to sell.
156. The reduction in market price results from a combination of the market's reevaluation of management and its assessment of the costs of replacing the managers through
takeover or otherwise. The market's re-evaluation of management might occur because investors
would find it distasteful to associate with the managers' views or, more likely, because the
speech indicates a general lack of probity that casts doubt on the managers' ability to make
rational business decisions.
157. See Stern v. General Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
shareholder action for corporate waste was not preempted by FECA, but complaint failed to

state cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty).
158. See ALBERT 0. HIscHmAN, Exrr, VoICE AND LoYvATY: REsPONSES TO DEcLin IN
Fnus, ORAZ I s, AND STATES (1970). As shareholder dissatisfaction with managers'
speech increases, "exit" becomes less satisfactory and "voice" becomes more satisfactory.
"Voice" is more likely than "exit" to result in discipline of the managers as distinguished
merely from relief for shareholders.
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not engage in political activities or in mutual funds that monitor the political
correctness of the corporations in which they invest. The availability of
choice of contracts further weakens the case for a mandatory prohibition.
To summarize the foregoing in terms of the Posner formula, 59 even if
there might be some loss to shareholders (L) from failing to restrict corporate
political speech, there is only a small probability (P) that a significant L
will ever occur.
2.

Corporate Speech Restrictions May Harm Shareholders

Even if shareholders need protection from managers' use of corporate
funds for political activity, prohibiting corporate political contributions and
expenditures may be an excessively costly way of providing this protection.
Thus, corporate speech restrictions may not optimize the total agency costs
previously described. 60 In terms of the Posner formula, B (the value of
permitting managers to speak for the corporation) may outweigh P x L.
First, even speech that benefits the managers personally may be an
efficient form of managerial compensation in the sense that the managers'
benefit from controlling corporate political activity exceeds the cost to the
shareholders of granting this power.' 6 1 The foregone benefit from this
efficient compensation may exceed the benefit derived from guarding against
the extremely unlikely event of managers' engaging in highly offensive
speech.
Second, corporate speech restrictions may exacerbate residual agency
loss because campaign laws channel corporate political activity into political
action committees. The laws allow use of corporate funds to organize and
operate PACs. 16 2 Although corporate PACs can solicit funds from shareholders as well as from employees, 163 they primarily solicit from managerial
employees.2 64 This may be due both to managers' wish to limit PAC
membership and to the high cost of soliciting shareholders compared to
shareholders' expected contributions. Shareholders would decline to contribute to corporate PACs for the same reasons that they would oppose political
activity-because they oppose activity seeking transfers between corporations

159. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (discussing Posner's formula).
160. See supra text accompanying note 149.
161. For applications of the cost/benefit analysis to insider trading, see HEINRY G. MANm,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 111-158 (1966); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. R-v. 857, 870-78 (1983); David D.
Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REv.
1449 (1986).
162. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Indeed, even before corporate political
action committees were authorized, corporations avoided restrictions on direct corporate
political activity by coordinating employee contributions. See SABATO, supra note 128, at 6-7.
163. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A) (providing that corporation may solicit "stockholders
and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families ... ").
164. See SABATO, supra note 128, at 61 (study showing that only 17% of corporate PACs
do any shareholder solicitation); Budde, supra note 136, at 456.
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in their portfolios and to corporations from noncorporate groups. '65
The combined effect of encouraging corporate PACs while prohibiting
direct activity by corporations may be to cause corporate speech to reflect
managers' interests even more than it would if it were channelled through
the corporation.'6 Managers may choose to use their PACs to advocate
laws, such as antitakeover statutes, that shift corporate power and resources
from shareholders to managers. If the managers sought to use corporate
treasury funds that way, they would be at least potentially subject to
shareholder discipline. It is true that managers could channel all political
activity through PACs even without restrictions on corporate speech. But
if corporations could use treasury funds for political purposes, shareholders
might be able to force managers to act politically through the corporation
rather than by funding PACs. Thus, by permitting corporations to organize
PACs but prohibiting them to act directly, current law reduces shareholder
power over corporate political actiyity.
Shareholders could, of course, form their own interest groups to oppose
those of managers. But the shareholders' groups, unlike "corporate" PACs,
would have to bear their own organizational costs. These costs, together
with the free-rider problem inherent in collective action, would inhibit such
efforts.
In sum, although the current scheme of regulation of corporate political
activity saves shareholders from the small agency cost of having their
invested funds used in ways they would oppose (P x L in Posner's formula),
it may increase agency cost by weakening incentive devices and increasing
the political power of managers vis Z, vis shareholders through PACs (B in
the Posner formula). Whether the latter costs exceed the former benefits is
an unanswered empirical question.
3.

Campaign Finance Laws Are an Inappropriate Means of Protecting
Shareholders

Despite the questions raised regarding the costs and benefits of shareholder-protection regulation, there is little doubt that the First Amendment
would not prohibit, and indeed arguably would protect, enforcement of a
contract among shareholders and the firm's managers to restrict the managers' right to use corporate funds to engage in political speech. 167 By the

165. See supra text accompanying note 94.
166. See Archibald Cox, Constitutional Issues in the Regulation of the Financing of
Election Campaigns,31 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 395, 410-11 (1982) (noting that it is PAC leadershipprimarily corporate executives-who obtain influence through PACs); SABATO, supra note 128,
at 34 (corporate CEO's normally have significant influence on activities of corporate PACs).
167. See Victor Brudney, Business Corporationsand Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981). Justice Brennan, in his Austin opinion, quoted the
following statement by Professor Brudney: "A's right to receive information does not require
the state to permit B to steal from C the funds that alone will enable B to make the
communication." Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, -,
110 S. Ct.
1391, 1406 (1990) (quoting Brudney, supra, 91 YALE L.J. at 247).
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same reasoning, a state ought to be able to provide through its corporation
statute a corporate speech limitation that corporations could adopt by
shareholder vote. If corporate speech limitations were provided by state
statute, it would be appropriate for Justice Brennan to rely on the traditional
state role of defining shareholder rights. 68 In other words, some regulation
of corporate speech might be consistent with the contract theory of the
corporation.
However, this defense of the shareholder-protection rationale assumes
that the rule ultimately is provided by the shareholders' contract. Justice
Scalia's view of that contract, expressed in his Austin dissent, differs from
the view represented by corporate speech restrictions. He points out that a
shareholder
knows that management may take any action that is ultimately in
accord with what the majority (or a specified supermajority) of the
shareholders wishes, so 1long
as that action is designed to make a
69
profit. That is the deal.
A statutory provision that overrides the shareholders' "deal" cannot rest
on a contractual foundation, but rather is based on the regulatory view of
70
the corporation.'
A campaign finance limit in a state corporation statute might be
defended on contractual grounds as to shareholders who invest in corporations bound by the provision. Even a seemingly "mandatory" provision
may be justified because shareholders who opposed the provision could
choose to invest in firms incorporated elsewhere,' 7 ' and because shareholders
might favor some protection against managers' changing the charter with
the approval of shareholders who are unable to organize effectively against
the charter amendment.
Federal campaign contribution limitations can be explained only in
terms of the regulatory theory of the corporation. The same is true of state
campaign laws that apply to campaign activity by all corporations in the

168. Austin, 494 U.S. at -,
110 S. Ct. at 1406 n.8 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)) (upholding state anti-takeover statute against Commerce
Clause and Supremacy Clause attack).
169. Id. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 1412.
170. If a state statute overrides an existing deal it is arguably unconstitutional under the
Contract Clause. For a discussion'of this problem in the context of state anti-takeover statutes,
see Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 505 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover
Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CN. L. Rnv. 611 (1988); Robert W. McGee, Mergers
and Acquisitions:An Economic and Legal Analysis, 22 CRaasorroN L. Rav. 665 (1989); Butler
& Ribstein, The Contract Clause, supra note 72, at 795-98. But it is unlikely shareholders can
now make this argument regarding corporate speech restrictions since these have been in place
for some time.
171. For this reason, state corporate law provisions could be regarded as not really
"mandatory." See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 542 (1990).

1992]

CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH

regulating state because it is so costly for investors to determine which
corporations have an interest in engaging in political activity in regulating
states and to adjust their portfolios accordingly.
This interference with private contracting might be justified if shareholders are incapable of choosing protection against the supposed agency
costs inherent in corporate political speech or if shareholders need protection
against managers' pushing through a move to reincorporate from a regulating to a nonregulating state. 172 The first argument ignores the powerful
market forces that discipline the terms of state corporation laws.1 73 Moreover, even if one of these conditions held, the mandatory nature of the
laws would be unjustified if the laws imposed costs in excess of benefits in
many of the situations in which they applied. 174 Even if mandatory statutes
might be justified on these grounds, the justifications would be suspect.
The fact that the government has acted through election statutes rather than
through corporation statutes indicates that the statutes are intended as direct
speech restrictions rather than as shareholder protection that only indirectly
impacts speech. As is generally the case with such direct viewpoint restrictions, 171 the nature of the restriction raises serious doubts about the sincerity
76
of a nonspeech-related justification.
In short, the shareholder-protection rationale for the current scheme of
restrictions on corporate political activity depends on a showing that (1)
shareholders incur agency costs from permitting corporate political activity
(L in the Posner formula); (2) that these costs outweigh benefits of permitting the managers to engage in corporate speech through the corporation
(B in the Posner formula); and (3) that the costs of leaving such protection
to shareholder choice outweigh the benefits of doing so. Such a showing
would be extraordinarily difficult to make.
Further, there is no justification for distinguishing ideological and forprofit corporations based on the need for shareholder protection. For the
1 77
reasons discussed below in connection with the "corruption" argument,
members of ideological corporations face high costs of exit, and therefore

172. For commentary favoring a mandatory federal rule on this basis, see Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice,
76 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1988).
173. See RALPH K. WINTER, Govu
AND TH CORPORATION (1978); Daniel R. Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rav. 913 (1982); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The
Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus FederalRegulation, 53 J.
Bus. 259 (1980).
174. See generally Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out, supra note 72 (comparing costs and
benefits of mandatory corporate rules).
175. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
176. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (refusing to recognize shareholder right of
action against managers under federal election law on ground that statute was not intended
to provide for such relief). Thus, this is an example of a "false positive"-that is, a
nonjustification for a speech restriction. See BeVier, supra note 59, at 1074-75.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 231-35.
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incur at least the same costs as the members of for-profit corporations
incur. 178
B.

Limiting Corporations'PoliticalPower

All the relevant Supreme Court cases embrace to some degree the notion
that government legitimately may constrain the political power of corporations in order to avoid "corruption" of the political system. But, before
beginning an evaluation of the variations of this argument, it is important
to consider what weight the argument should have. Regulation designed in
light of the "corruption" justification is based on the effect of a particular
type of speech (i.e., corporate) and therefore clearly is a viewpoint restriction. 79 Thus, accepting this justification is likely to involve a significant
impact on the nature of public debate, and therefore would represent a
high B in the Posner equation. It follows that the courts should accept such
a justification only upon a very strong showing of the potential for harm
combined with a showing that the regulation narrowly targets the harm.
An evaluation of the variations on the "corruption" justification shows
that such a strong showing of the potential for harm has not been made.
1. Interest Group Capture of Politicians
One version of the "corruption" argument asserts that it is necessary
to limit the purchase of politicians' votes by large companies. The Supreme
Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that FECA's contribution limits were
justified because "large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders."' 180 Commentators have
criticized Bellotti's invalidation of restrictions on corporate contributions as
facilitating "capture" of politicians by interest groups rather than ideol8
ogy. ' '
The problem with this argument in the present context is that it cannot
be used to distinguish corporate from noncorporate speech. "Capture"
results from the ability of interest groups of all kinds to supply the financial
support politicians need.8 2 Indeed, the Buckley reasoning was applied to
178. For a discussion of the essential similarities between ideological and for-profit
corporations from the standpoint of organization theory, see Wolfson, supra note 2.
179. See supra text accompanying note 56 (noting relevance to balancing of whether
speech restriction is directed at particular speech). A close analogy is the Indiana antipomography statute struck down in American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985), that targeted speech that degraded women. See supra note 66.
180. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
181. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEx. L. REV. 873, 912-14 (1987) (suggesting that this problem may be redressed by eliminating
"economic" PACs).
182. In fact, the "capture" theory resembles the first primitive approaches by political
scientists to explain regulation as a narrow function of influence solely by regulated firms.
See ART R F. BErrLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); DAviD B. TRumAN, THE
GOVERNMENrAL PROCESS: POLrrTCAL INTERESTS AND PUaC

OPINION

(1951). This theory has

long since been replaced by a broader theory that considers all of the relevant interest groups.
See sources cited supra note 115. For a comparison of the "capture" theory and the modem
economic theory of regulation, see Posner, supra note 115, at 341-44.
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limits on a variety of contributions. If corporations withdraw from the
field, this will simply reallocate strength to other interest groups, rather
than eliminate the financial "quid pro quo.""' There is no reason to believe
that such a shift is desirable.
2.

Equalizing the Influence of For-Profit Firms

A more sophisticated version of the "corruption" argument is that
unless corporate speech is limited corporations will have access to political
influence that is disproportionate to voter support. Under this equality
theory, the First Amendment lets government serve as a sort of traffic cop
in allocating communication channels so that all can be heard.'
This argument is based largely on the ability of for-profit firms to seek
collective goods as a "by-product" of support for their profit-making
activities.' 85 In other words, shareholders invest in the firm and consumers
buy the firm's products not because of the firm's political goals, but because
they are offered consumers' surplus or a financial return on their investment.
It follows that for-profit firms can support political views that are not
necessarily supported by the investors who fund this power. By contrast,
the MCFL Court believed that shareholders in "ideological" corporations
could withdraw if displeased with the firm's political goals without suffering
an economic penalty.8 6
This rationale provides at least one positive explanation for corporate
speech restrictions like the one involved in Austin.7 The statutes were first
passed in the early part of this century"88 during a time of general distrust
of large institutions that fueled the Populist and Progressive movements.8 9
It was also a time of distrust of large corporations that had recently broken
loose from state control as a result of the development of a national market
in corporate charters. 90 Just as the antitrust laws sought to reduce the scale
of enterprise,1 91 the first restrictions on corporate political activity sought
to reduce corporations' political power.

183. See Bolton, supra note 62, at 417.
184. See Cox, supra note 166, at 417 (analogizing such restrictions to applying Roberts'
Rules of Order).
185. See supra text accompanying note 123.
186. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
256-60 (1986).
187. For an alternative explanation, see infra text accompanying note 255.
188. The first such restriction, the federal Corrupt Practices Act, was passed in 1907.
Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). The Michigan statute involved in Austin
descended from the Michigan Corrupt Practices Act, 1913 Mich. Pub. Acts 109.
189. For a discussion linking this distrust to control of the power of financial institutions,
see Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American CorporateFinance, 91 CoLum. L. Ray. 10,
32-36 (1991).
190. See supra note 72.
191. The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, following antitrust statutes or
constitutional amendments by eighteen states in 1889-90. See Wnu.I Lrw-N., LAw AND
ECONOM1IC PoLIcY IN AMERICA: Tim EvOUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 53-99 (1965)

(discussing adoption of Sherman Antitrust Act and historical context).
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The equality idea was an important basis of the earliest restrictions on

corporate political activity' 92 and was later urged by some influential commentators. 193 The justification was, however, at first soundly rejected in
Buckley v. Valeo: "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."' 94 Justice Powell also firmly
rejected the equality justification in Bellotti

95

He quoted the above language

from Buckley in opposition to the argument that corporate speech may
"drown out" other viewpoints.

96

Justice Powell also noted that the equality

argument had been accepted only in the "special context of limited access
to channels of communication,' 97 and had been rejected even in the more
persuasive context of candidates' access to newspaper space. 198
Nevertheless, the equality principle emerged in Justice White's Bellotti

dissent, 199 in NRWCm and in MCFL where, as just noted, it provided a
basis for distinguishing ideological and business corporations. In Austin this
version of the "corruption" argument became the central basis for limiting
corporate speech. The Austin Court distinguished the danger of "financial

quid pro quo" corruption relied on in Buckley to justify legislation aimed
at contributions from the "different type of corruption"

at which the

Michigan's expenditure restriction aimed. According to the Austin Court,
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas."201
192. See United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916)
(citing equality justification in rejecting First Amendment challenge to campaign financing
law); Bolton, supra note 62, at 376 (discussing role of equality justification in early campaign
financing laws).
193. See CARLs E.

LINDBLOM,

POUTICS & MARLKERS 194 (1977) (discussing unequal power

of businessmen in electoral activity); Cox, supra note 166, at 410-11; Wright, supra note 61,
at 640. See also Schneider, supra note 79, at 1259-61; Note, The Corporation and the
Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833 (1981) (discussing effect of First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), on corporate political
activity).
194. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
195. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92. Justice Powell wrote that there was no evidence that
"corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes," and did not
find the argument "inherently presuasive or supported by the precedents of this Court." Id.
at 789, 790.
196. Id. at 790-91.
197. Id. at 791 n.30 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
198. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
199. Id. at 809-12 (White, J., dissenting).
200. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-10
(1982) (discussing early history of restrictions on union and corporate contributions and noting
that such restrictions may be necessary to protect "the integrity of our electoral process")
(quoting United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570
(1957)).
201. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 ....
110 S. Ct. 1391,
1397 (1990).
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The Supreme Court had it right in Buckley and Bellotti. Inequalities of
resources and opportunities for communication are pervasive and complete
equality is an unachievable goal. Accordingly, any implementation of an
equality principle would necessitate pervasive government interference and
inevitably difficult choices about what sorts of inequalities should be tolerated.m
The Austin majority attempted to reconcile limitation of corporate
speech with the Court's rejection of the "equality" principle by reasoning
that it is not corporate wealth in itself that justifies regulation, but rather
the fact that this wealth is accumulated by means of "the unique stateconferred corporate structure."' 2 3 But this reasoning simply returns to the
argument based on supposedly state-conferred corporate privileges. Because
that argument is itself invalid, 20 it cannot be used to bolster the "inequality"
justification. As Justice Scalia said in Austin:
When the vessel labeled "corruption" begins to founder under
weight too great to be logically sustained, the argumentation jumps
to the good ship "special privilege"; and when that in turn begins
to go down, it returns to "corruption." Thus hopping back and
forth between the two, the argumentation may survive but makes
20 5
no headway towards port, where its conclusion waits in vain.
One possible way to square the "corruption" argument with the Court's
earlier rejection of the equality principle is to show that restricting corporate
political power will prevent at least gross disparities in political power
between corporations and other interest groups. This would preserve democratic processes and prevent massive wealth transfers rather than serve the
discredited goal of ensuring equal voice.
But there is no reason to believe that unrestricted corporate speech
would lead to massive wealth transfers to for-profit firms. In the first place,
the "by-product" theory of collective action, in which firms use surplus
from noncollective activity to support political action, 2°6 applies to both forprofit and "ideological" firms. Many ideological firms grow large and
powerful by combining selective incentives and political goals,0 such as the
outdoor activities offered by the Sierra Club. 20 8 Labor unions and farm
202. For commentary critical of applying an equality principle under the First Amendment,
see BAKER, supra note 89, at 37-46; BeVier, supra note 59, at 1058-60.
203. Austin, 494 U.S. at -,
110 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
204. See id. at 1409-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra section III(A).
205. Austin, 494 U.S. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 1411.
206. See supra text accompanying note 123.
207. See TERRY M. MOE, TIE ORGANIZATION OF INTEREsTS 47-51, 67-68 (1980) (noting
some ways that organizers of interest groups can manipulate selective incentives to maximize
support); Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee,
at 18-20, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990)

(No. 88-1564).208. See RUSSELL HARDnN, ConuCTIvW

ACTION

32 (1982) (stating that outings were major

early motivation for joining Sierra Club), 105 (stating that Sierra Club's political activities
supported by contributions rather than by members' dues).
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groups in particular have amassed considerable membership by offering
economic benefits, such as insurance, that are separate from the organizations' political goals. 209 In fact, it is often difficult to determine whether
membership in such groups is motivated primarily by selective incentives,
210
ideology or other considerations.
Moreover, even if for-profit firms have more surplus potentially available for political activity than do nonprofit firms, the former's political
advantage cannot be determined without comparing the firms' opportunity
costs for their surplus. Corporate managers who are acting in their principals' interests will invest the firm's surplus in nonpolitical activities if its
risk-adjusted return from doing so exceeds that from investing in political
activities. For-profit firms that extensively engage in productive activities
probably face significantly higher opportunity costs for their surplus than
do nonprofit firms that engage primarily in political activities.
Imperfectly disciplined managers may invest surplus in political activities
if they will personally gain from doing so, even if the firm does not. But
there is no reason to believe that even imperfectly disciplined for-profit
managers will systematically gain more from political investments than from
nonpolitical investments given their ability to divert financial gain from
nonpolitical investments to themselves through excessive compensation and
the like. Indeed, managers in for-profit firms are less likely to prefer political
investments for selfish reasons than those in ideological firms given the for21
profit managers' significant opportunities for financial gain. '
Even if for-profit firms have some advantage under the "by-product"
theory in generating surplus for collective action, 2 2 ideological groups may
be able to overcome this advantage by organizing at lower cost because of
forceful leaders who serve as "political entrepreneurs" out of initial commitment to a cause; 2 3 because many members have sufficient moral or
political commitment to the cause or group that they are willing to incur
the costs of membership without being offered selective incentives; 2 4 because
geographical proximity of members makes the group relatively easy to

209. See MOE, supra note 207, at 61 (noting importance of union shop rules in increasing
union membership), 168-76 (discussing importance of economic incentives in American labor
unions), 181-91 (discussing economic incentives in farm group membership), 205-18 (summarizing results of questioning members of various interest groups). As an example of the
importance of selective incentives to attracting members to these groups, Moe reports that in
1971 the Farm Bureau had 7000 members in Cook County, Illinois, where Chicago and only
1000 farms were located, and that Indiana had 50 percent more Farm Bureau members than
farms. Id. at 185 (citing SAMUEL R. BEROER, Dou.A HARVEST 26 (1971)).
210. See generally Hardin, supra note 208.
211. One commentator has argued that nonprofits are organized as such precisely in order
to prevent managers from engaging in undetectable diversion of profits. See Henry Hansmann,
Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 267 (1988).
212. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
213. See HARDiN, supra note 208, at 35-37.
214. Id. at 106; MOE, supra note 207, at 113-19.
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organize; 2 5 or because interest groups offer social or relational incentives
to join26 or provide "prominent"

ideologies.

217

rallying points for people with shared

Moreover, interest groups' ability to compete in political markets does

not depend solely on financial resources. First, some organizations, such as
civil rights groups, have had a significant impact primarily because their
218
members contribute time to such activities as marches and vote drives.
Second, groups may be strong simply because politicians realize that a
comparatively small membership may, precisely because of the difficulty of
collective action, represent a much larger supply of votes. 2 9 Third, groups'

influence depends partly on their ability to coordinate their activities.
Accordingly, labor PACs may be able to compete effectively with corporate
PACs because, like a cartel, they are better able to concentrate their
resources on, and therefore control, particular politicians.2 0 To illustrate,
suppose an ideological firm has only $.50 of surplus that is potentially
available for political activity, while a potential transferee for-profit firm
has $.60. The ideological firm may be able to outbid the for-profit firm
where, for example: (1) the for-profit firm has a much higher-value use for
$.10 of its surplus; (2) the ideological firm can cheaply raise an additional
$.10 of political capital; and (3) the ideological firm can bid nonfinancial
resources to offset the remaining $.10 difference.
In light of the significant power of noncorporate interest groups,

restricting corporate speech may upset or prevent a desirable equilibrium
among competing interest groups that otherwise would exist. Madison
recognized at the time of the drafting of the Constitution not only the
inevitability of "factions," but also that in a large republic no single faction
could dominate.' Gary Becker has shown that interest group competition

215. For studies of the effect of geographic concentration on interest group formation,
see Gilbert Becker, The PublicInterest Hypothesis Revisited: A New Test of Peltzman's Theory
of Regulation, 49 PuB. CHOICE 223 (1986); Sally C. Kilbane & John H. Beck, Professional
Associations and the Free Rider Problem: The Case of Optometry, 65 PuB. CHOICE 181 (1990);
Sharon M. Oster, An Analysis of Some Causes of Interstate Differences in Consumer
Regulations, 18 ECON. INQuiRY 39 (1980); GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, in THEs CITIZEN AND THE STATE 114 (1975).
216. See MOE, supra note 207, at 113-19; HARDIN, supra note 208, at 32-33 (explaining

this as important explanation for women's organizations); Carole J. Uhlaner, "Relational
Goods" and Participation:Incorporating Sociability Into a Theory of Rational Action, 62
Pun. CHOICE 253 (1989) (offering model to predict group mobilization based on interactions
among persons).
217. See HARDIN, supra note 208, at 223 (discussing prominence of Sierra Club).
218. See HARDN, supra note 208, at 110.
219. Id.at 225.
220. See Gerald Keim & Asghar Zardkoohi, Looking for Leverage inPAC Markets:
Corporate and Labor ContributionsConsidered, 58 PuB. CHOICE 21 (1988). The authors argue

that corporate PACs face bigger coordination problems because they are more numerous and
represent more disparate interests. The authors present data that labor PACs are better able
than corporate PACs to contribute to candidates consistent with ideology, rather than mostly,
as is the case with corporate PACs, as "protection money" to more powerful incumbents.
221. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 10 (James Madison).
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may cause laws to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient because some interest groups
offset the influence of others. 2 As government subsidies rise, so do benefits
to transferors from resisting the subsidies. At the same time, transferees'
benefits decline because they share the increasing dead-weight costs from
the subsidies. 223 Thus, unless a particular group is very effective at seeking
influence, the competition among groups tends to produce laws whose
benefits outweigh their costs. 224 For example, law efficiency may have
increased as environmentalists and customers became more organized, and
therefore more able to counteract the power of polluters and producers.2
Conversely, there may be significant efficiency benefits from allowing corporations to act as a counterforce against other interest groups and political
226
agents.
Even if corporations' political strength is somewhat disproportionate to
their popular support, this is a long way from showing that full participation
of corporations would dominate other views. Rather, the argument reduces
227
to one that corporate power should be distributed to other groups.
Obviously the winners will prefer this outcome, but that alone does not
make the laws restricting corporate speech constitutional. n 8

222. See Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs, 28
J. PUB. EcON. 329 (1985); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983) (stating that political equilibrium depends
on efficiency of each group in producing pressure, effect of additional pressure on their
influence, number of persons in different groups, and deadweight costs of taxes and subsidies).
Effective interest groups also can offset the tendency toward redistribution of wealth
among districts. Powerful politicians may maximize votes in their own district by securing
legislation that benefits their districts at the expense of nonresident voters. But money is more
mobile than votes. Thus, legislators may be disciplined by the threat of losing contributions
from outside the district. See W. Mark Crain, Robert D. Tollison, & Donald R. Leavens,
Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 56 PuB. CHOICE 201 (1988), showing that in states that
do not regulate campaign finance there are fewer government transfers than in states that do
regulate campaign finance. The authors also show that there are more laws in such states,
indicating that regulation of campaign finance involves a trade-off between, on the one hand,
"off-budget" wealth transfers to corporations and labor from less organized interest groups
and, on the other, "on-budget" wealth transfers directly from government.
223. See Becker, Public Policies, supra note 222. Note that even if subsidies measured by
corporate profits are less than the transferees' costs, there still may be a net gain taking into
account redistributions by the benefitting firms, including increased wages. See id. at 338.
224. Id.
225. See Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1982)
(speculating that formation of environmental groups to lobby and litigate for change has
resulted in greater efficiency). See also Terry L. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Ideology,
Interest Groups and the Repeal of the Corn Laws, 141 J. INsT. & THEOR. EcoN. 197 (1985)
(corn tariffs repealed as result of affiliation of interest groups motivated by economic selfinterest).
226. Crain, Tollison & Leavens, supra note 222.
227. In terms of the graph supra note 121, the groups to the left of and above P* will
continue to obtain wealth-transfers from the groups to the right of and below P*-f, but the
identities of the two sets of groups will change in that corporations may move from the left
to the right, from beneficiary to victim of interest group transfers.
228. Indeed, not only is redistributing power among groups not sufficiently desirable to
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In short, it makes no sense to restrict corporate speech on "corruption"
grounds in order to redress a supposed imbalance between corporate political
power and voter support. There is no basis for the argument that corporate
political power imposes a significant cost on society (L in the Posner
formula), and corporate political speech may be a valuable way to achieve
balance among interest groups (B in the Posner formula). This justification
for corporate speech restrictions should be rejected.
3.

Equalizing Managers' Power

Another form of the "corruption" argument is that unrestricted corporate political speech gives "undue" power to corporate managers. In this
form the argument asserts that managers can use resources contributed by
shareholders and others to finance managers' views that are not supported
by other corporate participants. This argument underlies the MCFL Court's
sharp distinction between members of for-profit and of "ideological" corporations regarding their support for the organization's political goals.229
But this argument merely restates the agency-cost justification rejected
above.20 Just as there is no basis for concluding that regulation is necessary
to protect shareholders of for-profit corporations from corporate speech
with which they disagree, so there is no basis for distinguishing for-profit
and ideological groups in this regard.
Indeed, there are several reasons for concluding that there may be an
even greater agency-cost problem in ideological firms than in for-profit
firms. For members of ideological groups who disagree with the group's
positions, exit often is even less an option than it is for corporate shareholders.' Members who joined for idiosyncratic selective incentives may
lose the benefits entirely rather than obtaining cash that is fungible with
their investments. Moreover, a given group may be the only one representing
a certain ideological position, so that a dissatisfied member who joined for
both ideological and nonideological reasons would have to incur the signif32
icant costs of organizing another group?2
And even if there are available

justify interfering with a First Amendment right, but it may perversely influence the results
of political competition. The reason is that differences among firms concerning their surplus
available for political activity are not random, but in fact are correlated to some extent with
organizational efficiency. In other words, the success of efficiently organized firms succeed in
financial and product markets is transferred to political markets.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 (discussing MCLF).

230. See supra section V(A) (discussing agency-cost justification).
231. Exit from for-profit corporations is discussed infra at notes 153-158.
232. Where the optimal size of the organization is large (because marginal benefits of
increased size exceed the marginal cost of additional members) compared to the number of
people sharing a given ideology, any competing club would be inefficiently small. In this

situation, the member of an existing organization would not be able to viably threaten exit
for purposes of forming a competing organization. See Dennis C. Mueller, PUBLic CHOICE II,
A RavisED EDriION OF PuBuc CHOICE at 150-54 (1989) (discussing club sizes in relation to
achievement of public and private goods); James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of
Clubs, 32 ECONOMCA 1 (1965) (same).
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substitutes, they may involve significantly higher costs of joining.2 3 Additionally, members who have difficulty exiting usually do not have as effective
a voting mechanism as do shareholders in for-profit firms. Accordingly, an
ideological group's political goals may differ from those of most of the4
members, particularly those who have joined for nonpolitical reasons.2
5
This membership support can become, in turn, the basis of political action.?
Corporate power may, in fact, better represent voter support than
groups that would gain from a reallocation of corporate political power

through speech restrictions. Corporations are conduits to people.2 6 Managers
who expend corporate funds for speech are subject to constraints by all of
the contracts to which the corporation is a party. Managers risk offending
not only shareholders, but also workers, consumers, and members of local
7
communities with the power to regulate or grant concessions to the firm.2
Each of these groups can exercise displeasure both through voice (as with
shareholders) or through exit (as with customers) by refraining from dealing
with the firm. Thus, corporate speech must normally be at least generally
consistent with the views of a cross-section of the community. Conversely,
even in the most purely "ideological" associations wealthier voters may
dominate because a member's financial "vote" for a particular organization
represents not merely the strength of her commitment to the cause, but also

the number of dollars the member has to available to commit.2 8

C. A Rent-Seeking Justificationfor Corporate Speech Restrictions
The state interest that provides the most promising justification for
corporate speech regulation is a concern with reducing the deadweight costs
233. See Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Putting the Puzzle Together: Why People Join Public
Interest Groups, 60 PuB. CHOICE 241 (1989) (setting forth cost/benefit explanation of membership in Common Cause); HARDIN, supra note 208, at 223 (stating that Sierra Club overcomes
collective action problem partly by being "prominent" choice toward which environmentally
conscious people gravitate).
234. See HARDnm, supra note 208, at 122-23 (explaining that whether group works toward
ideological goals depends in part on extent to which members have ideological commitment
to organization); see also MoE, supra note 207, at 74:
What the by-product theory asserts, in other words, is a disjunction between member
goals and group goals. There is no necessary connection between the two in latent
groups. As long as members are tied into the group by means of selective incentives,
it is to their advantage to continue contributing even if they disagree with associational
policy, and even if the group is entirely unsuccessful in achieving goals they agree
with. The leadership can pursue an independent course without fear of losing either
members or their contributions and is set free of member pressure in respect to
political issues and activities.
An example of this disjunction is the Farmers Union, which Moe characterizes as far
more liberal than its membership. Id. at 188.
235. For a recent humorous survey of the disproportionate political strength of the farm
lobby relative to the number of farmers, and how this has translated into massive wealth
transfers to farmers, see P. J. O'Rousuc, PARLIAMENT OF WHoPEs 142-53 (1991).
236. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 4, 26 (1987).
237. See Malbin, supra note 129, at 259-60.
238. See HARDnq, supra note 208, at 88-89 (noting that government programs tend to
benefit more affluent).
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of rent-seeking. Even this interest, however, cannot outweigh the corporation's substantial speech interest at stake, because of the existence of the
alternative of private contracting within the firm.
The problem of deadweight costs from rent-seeking was first identified
by Gordon Tullock. 9 Rent-seeking includes earning "rents," or monopoly
profits, through government-engineered wealth redistributions.M It is distinguished from rent-creation by private efforts through, for example, the
invention of a new product. 1 Because rent-seeking shifts rather than creates
wealth, it can reduce net social wealth by at least some of the amount of
the resources committed to the rent-seeking. 242 These include amounts spent
in seeking government action, in seeking political office, and in shifting in
and out of activities for purposes of obtaining transfers. 243 These and other
costs may result from politicians' ability not only to serve as brokers for
wealth transfers to interest groups, but also actively to extract rents by
threatening regulation. 2' Firms may avoid productive activity because of
the risk that politicians and regulators may be able to appropriate a portion
of the privately-created surplus from such activities. 24
Rent-seeking is inefficient not because of who wins and loses, but
because there are significant costs in creating winners and losers. To use
Gordon Tullock's colorful example, nepotism may be good because it
reduces the number of people competing for a job: "Thus, if Mayor Richard
Daley had confined all of the more lucrative appointments to his close
relatives, the social savings might have been considerable." 2 4 Therefore,
the rent-seeking argument is promising as a justification for corporate speech
restrictions in part because minimizing rent-seeking costs has been shown
to be an important policy underlying several aspects of the Constitution. In

239. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WEST.
EcoN. J.224 (1967) [hereinafter Welfare Costs]. These costs were first termed "rent-seeking"
by Anne 0. Krueger in The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am. ECON.
REv. 291 (1974). Other papers by Tullock on rent seeking costs include The Cost of Transfers,
24 KYKLOs 629 (1971) and Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game and Efficient Rent Seeking,
in TowARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEMNG SOCmTY (James M. Buchanan, et al. eds. 1980).
240. As Tullock pointed out in his initial paper, similar problems are created by private
theft and monopoly. See Tuilock, Welfare Costs, supra note 239.
241. For a useful discussion distinguishing rent-seeking and beneficial rent-creation, see
James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY, supra note 239.
242. Not all rent-seeking expenditures are wasted, since payments to politicians and
bureaucrats may make them better off. See Michael A. Brooks & Ben J. Heijdra, In Search
of Rent-Seeking, in THE PoMcAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 30-31 (C. Rowley et al. eds.,
1988); Boudreaux, Imperfectly Competitive Firms, Non-Price Competition, and Rent Seeking,
145 J.INST. & Tao. ECON. 597, 601-05 (1989).
243. See Buchanan, supra note 239, at 12-15.
244. See McChesney, supra note 116.
245. See McChesney, supra note 116, at 105-08 (discussing effects of political extraction
of rents).
246. Tulock, Efficient Rent Seeking, supra note 239, at 103. Tullock was referring to
Richard J.Daley, not the son, Richard M. Daley, who took office after a costly election
campaign some time after the father's death.
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the "veil of ignorance" in which constitutions are drafted, 247 the parties to
the constitution do not know whether they will be winners or losers from
rent-seeking, but each knows that he will bear part of the deadweight costs
of rent-seeking. Thus, the Constitution has been interpreted as establishing
procedures that reduce rent-seeking by raising its cost, including separation
of powers, election of different parts of government by different sets of
voters, and limits on delegations of legislative authority to bureaucratic
agencies.m Additionally, the Contract Clause of the Constitution 249 has been
interpreted as invalidating a class of legislation that is particularly likely to
involve deadweight rent-seeking costs.250
The rent-seeking argument also is promising because it is at least
plausible that corporate speakers themselves would favor statutory restrictions on their speech. Statutory restrictions, particularly insofar as they limit
contributions, help corporations reduce private costs from political activity
that they would not voluntarily engage in but for collective action problems.
The central point is that corporations as a group may lose from rentseeking. Fred McChesney has demonstrated how organization of nonproducer interest groups may be costly because it exposes the groups to increased
rent-extraction by politicians. 1 Because firms organize as a by-product of
their business activities, they cannot choose to avoid organization in order
to resist rent-extraction. Also, corporations compete poorly in the political
game against more coordinated groups, particularly labor groups. 2 2 Both
evidence and" theory reveal that corporations contribute not so much to
support particular legislators or legislation, but as a kind of "protection
money" to avoid being hurt for not contributing.2Y3
Despite the likelihood of being net political losers, individual firms
cannot afford to refuse to participate in the game because they may lose
more by wealth transfers to participating firms than they save in rentseeking costs. Prohibiting corporate political activity is a way out of this

247. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
248. See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Cm.
L. REv. 703, 715-16 (1984) (discussing system of checks and balances as technique to prevent
legislative abuses); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471 (1988)
(recognizing ability of constitutions to Taise transaction costs of redistributive legislation). See
also Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986) (suggesting rent-seekingmininizing approach to statutory interpretation).
249. "No State shall ... pass any ...
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, ch. 1.

Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts."

250. See Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause, supra note 72, at 778-82; Butler & Ribstein,
State Anti-Takeover Statutes, supra note 170, at 641; Epstein, supra note 248, at 716; Douglas
W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding,
14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 534 (1987).

251. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a
CoaseanModel of Regulation, 20 J. LEoAL STUD. 73 (1991).
252. See Keim & Zardkhooi, supra note 136.
253. See supra note 220.
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classic prisoners' dilemma problem. If winners and losers from corporate
speech cannot be identified in advance, all firms would favor the prohibition. In other words, corporate speech restrictions limit speech that is, in
a sense, involuntary.
Indeed, the rent-seeking theory may explain why corporate political
activity is restricted, despite corporations' ability to engage in lobbying,
litigation and other activity against such regulation. This explanation has
some historical support: Major legislation restricting corporate political
activity followed episodes of flagrant "shakedowns" of corporations by
political fund-raisers.2 5
There are, however, serious problems with the rent-seeking justification.
Most importantly, as with the other justifications previously discussed, a
legislative solution does not offer clear benefits over private contracting.
The problem of deadweight costs from rent-seeking is simply a different
version of the agency cost problem discussed throughout this Article:
diversified shareholders do not gain as much as managers do from expenditures to obtain intraportfolio wealth transfers. 6 It is true that there is a
coordination problem in that firms may not refrain from seeking wealth-

254. It might seem that large firms would oppose restrictions on corporate speech because
they will consistently be winners. In an industry consisting of many firms, the industry as a
whole may act collectively to obtain a particular law, but only because a few firms in the
industry (perhaps the bigger firms) receive sufficiently large benefits to incur the costs of
seeking collective action. These firms will influence the content of the regulation to benefit
them, possibly at the expense of other companies in the industry. For example, regulation that
increases costs may help an industry by providing an entry barrier, but because of scale
economies the regulation may help large firms more than small firms. See Michael T. Maloney
& Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J. L.
& EcoN. 99 (1982); B. Peter Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal
Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1984); Ann P. Bartel & Lacy G. Thomas,
Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA 's Impact, 28 J. L. & ECON.
1 (1985). For discussions of the effect of assymmetry in resolving collective action problems
see HARnN, supra note 208, at 67-89; Posner, supra note 115; George J. Stigler, Free Riders
and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGmT. Sci. 359 (1974). Accordingly, while large firms in large industries may favor corporate
political activity, a much larger number of small firms which would be significant net losers
from rent-seeking costs may have enough at stake to oppose corporate political activity. But
small firms are not necessarily losers. For example, small business joined in the populist
movement favoring small institutions. See Roe, supranote 189, at 33. Moreover, small business
can form effective organizations such as the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce involved
in Austin.
255. See SABATO, supra note 128, at 3-5 (discussing Tillman Act of 1907 following flagrant
"assessments" of business on behalf of McKinley's 1896 campaign and 1974 amendments to
Federal Election Campaign Act following Watergate).
Certainly, however, there are other forces at work. Incumbents may be net gainers from
corporate speech restrictions if this political capital would flow disproportionately to challengers. Also, as noted supra notes 187-90, there was popular support for restrictions on large
corporations. And managers may have selfish reasons for favoring the combination of permitting PAC activity while restricting direct corporate activity. See supra text accompanying
notes 162-66.
256. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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transfers if they fear that others will not also refrain. But legislation is
unnecessary to solve this problem because shareholders can contract for
bonding devices that ensure that managers do not incur deadweight rent7
seeking costs.25
Moreover, even if the rent-seeking justification makes sense, it cannot
be applied such that the costs of valuable speech it deters do not outweigh
the benefits of reducing deadweight rent-seeking costs. Perhaps the First
Amendment could be interpreted as permitting restrictions on political speech
that target the most wasteful forms of rent-seeking activity in the political
process. 2 8 But all political activity involves rent-seeking. Granting legislatures a broad power to restrict rent-seeking involves a high risk of error (E
in the Posner equation) in sorting out "legitimate" and "rent-seeking"
legislation.2 9
There are several respects in which a rent-seeking justification for
corporate speech restrictions would be difficult to confine. First, the rentseeking justification offers no clear limit on corporate speech restrictions
according to the type of political spending. In other words, there is no
reason to stop at campaign contributions and expenditures. At the extreme,
lobbying expenditures, PAC spending and all corporate political activity
could be curbed.
Second, there is no clear reason to distinguish on rent-seeking grounds
between for-profit and ideological firms. Under a rent-seeking theory it is
necessary to show that political activity by for-profit firms is more likely
than other political activity to divert resources from privately creating rents
to merely seeking government-engineered transfers. But political activities
of nonprofit organizations and un-organized individuals also may divert
resources from wealth-creating activity or savings. If political speech by
ideological groups was restricted, these groups might either substitute other
forms of rent-seeking, such as litigation,2 60 or reduce their total expenditure
of resources. The latter course of action might both return resources to
productive use and reduce the need for responsive rent-seeking by for-profit
groups.
Third, there is no reason to distinguish between corporate commercial
and political speech. The Court has indicated that commercial speech

257. On the analogous question of the efficacy of private contracting in the context of
anti-takeover defenses compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole
of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAsv. L. REv. 1161 (1981)
(arguing for mandatory rules to solve defection problem) with David D. Haddock, Property
Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701 (1987) (arguing for
private contracting).
258. Cf. Charles K. Rowley, Rent-Seeking in a ConstitutionalPerspective, in THE PoUTICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 447, 462-63 (1988) (suggesting ban on campaign contributions
to individual candidates to reduce wasteful rent-seeking).
259. See Posner, supra note 236, at 10, 23-24.
260. For a discussion of litigation as rent-seeking conduct see Paul H. Rubin, Common
Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 205 (1982).
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generally should be given less protection than political speech. 261 Such a
distinction may not be justified as to speech generally, 262 and the rentseeking argument does not provide much support for reversing the direction
of the distinction in the context of corporate speech. Perhaps corporate
commercial speech is more likely to involve productive rent-creating activity
than corporate political speech, 263 but much commercial speech involving
competition between firms in the same industry is aimed at wealth-transAt the same
ferring market share increases rather than wealth-creation.
2 64
time, there are real benefits from some political speech.
By the same token, the rent-seeking analysis does not support a distinction between expenditures by media corporations and by nonmedia firms,
apart from any support for such a distinction by the "press clause" of the
First Amendment.2 5 Just as with commercial speech, expenditures by media
firms can be characterized as productive rent-creating activity rather than
as deadweight rent-seeking. 26 Also, media communications increase voters'
information costs and, accordingly, their ability to constrain wealth transfers
to interest groups. The same, however, can be said of some corporate
political speech.2 7 Moreover, expenditures by media corporations can en-

261. For a leading test for the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions, see
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980):
For commercial speech to come within [First Amendment protection], it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
262. Commentators have suggested that the distinction between commercial and political
speech is justified, among other reasons, because commercial speech, due to its economic
motivation, is less likely to be chilled by regulation; the First Amendment protects only speech
relevant to our representative form of government; government is better able to determine the
truth of commercial than of other forms of speech; and the "marketplace" of ideas may not
be effective protection against falsehood in certain forms of commercial speech (e.g., private
speech by professionals). See generally Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212
(1984); Symposium, The First Amendment and Federal Securities Regulation, 20 CONN. L.
Ray. 261 (1988); Symposium, Panel III, FirstAmendment Protectionsand Economic Activity,
11 GEo. MASON U.L. REy. 81-114 (No. 2) (1988). For criticisms of the distinction, see R. H.
Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977); Nicholas Wolfson, The First
Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. Rnv. 265 (1988).
263. Note, however, that the distinction between corporate commercial and corporate
political speech cannot be justified on the ground that corporate political speech is more likely
to be contrary to shareholders' interests, since the two types of speech involve identical agency
cost problems.
264. See supra section III(B)(2).
265. This was an important point of contention in Austin, because the Michigan statute
did make that distinction. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
110 S. Ct. 1401-02 (1990).
266. This distinction between productive rent-creating activity and deadweight rent-seeking
activity is discussed supra text accompanying notes 239-45.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 114-42.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:109

hance their political influence, just like corporate expenditures for political
speech generally.
Finally, the rent-seeking justification does not support a distinction
between for-profit corporationsand other types of for-profit firms. Perhaps
the distinction could be based on a rough split between large and small
firms, but it is far from clear that large firms are disproportionately
responsible for wasteful political rent-seeking. Indeed, if anything, the
opposite may be the case: large firms, at least in concentrated industries,
do not need to act politically because they can achieve the same benefits
through privately coordinated activity. 268 In any event, there are many small
corporations that are not exempted from the regulation. All of this indicates
that the corporate/noncorporate distinction is really based on the outmoded
state-privilege argument 269 or is simply a holdover from the distrust of the
corporate form that motivated the first corporate campaign statutes. 270
VI.

CONCLUSION

Regulating corporate political speech significantly interferes with political expression, and so raises First Amendment concerns. These concerns
should not be overlooked because the speech is attributed to an artificial
entity rather than to specific people, or because people affiliated with
corporations can speak outside the firm. Thus, the important question from
the standpoint of the pragmatic approach applied in this Article is whether
the costs of corporate speech restrictions outweigh the benefits.
The justifications that have been discussed here are weak. The shareholder-protection, "corruption," and rent-seeking justifications all assume
agency problems that cannot be solved by private contracting. While this is
consistent with a regulatory theory of the corporation, it is inconsistent with
the substantial modem literature supporting the viability of private contracting in the firm.
One problem with the justifications for corporate speech restrictions is
that they are based on untested assertions. State regulation of corporate
campaign contributions might be tested by interstate comparisons. The rentseeking justification might be tested by comparing the law output of
regulating and nonregulating states. 271 The "corruption" argument could be
supported by comparing the types of laws found in regulating and nonregulating states. The shareholder-protection hypothesis, however, is difficult

268. See Michael C. Munger, On the PoliticalParticipationof the Firm in the Electoral
Process: An Update, 56 Put. CHoIcE 295 (1988) (showing evidence that firms' PAC contributions are not correlated with industry concentration); Asghar Zardkhoohi, On the Political
Participationof the Firm in the Electoral Process, 51 S. ECON. J. 804 (1985) (setting forth
earlier study reaching similar conclusion); Posner, supra note 115; Stigler, Free Riders, supra
note 254 (showing evidence that industry association size is not correlated with industry
concentration).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 67-80.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 185-88.
271. For a study applying this approach, see Crain, Tollison & Leavens, supra note 222.
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to test: because campaign finance laws apply irrespective of state of incorporation, and therefore apply to most large companies, it is probably
impossible to do meaningful stock-price comparisons between regulated and
nonregulated firms. Nevertheless, it might be useful to learn the extent of
any injury to shareholders from permitting corporate PAC activity by
investigating a possible correlation between PAC contributions and promanagement legislation.
In the final analysis, Justice Powell's holding in Bellotti that corporate
speech should be protected under the First Amendment makes much more
sense as constitutional doctrine than the post-Bellotti cases. Whether or not
the Supreme Court ultimately may have reached the correct result in the
later cases, the Court's analysis in reaching these results is fundamentally
flawed. The Court must begin to base its decisions on well-developed modern
economic theory rather than on unsupported assertions about corporations
and the political process. It is particularly important to understand that any
regulation of corporate speech or of the electoral process can have farreaching consequences in terms of both the costs of governing the firm and
the deadweight costs of effecting wealth transfers among interest groups.
Until the Court understands these consequences, its decisions may be the
proverbial bull in the china shop, particularly as pressure builds for more
extensive reform of campaign financing and of corporate political activity.

